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Abstract
This dissertation consists of four essays on health and demographic economics. In the
first chapter, I explore the implementation of the theory of equality of opportunity (EOp)
developed by Roemer (1998) to health in a joint work with Guillem Lopez and Frederic
Udina. According to the theory of EOp, individuals’ outcomes depend both on effort and
circumstances and, since individuals are only reponsible for their effort, inequalities rooted
in differences in circumstances ought to be compensated. A common impediment to the
achievement of EOp applications with given resources constraints is that it is unlikely
that public policies can fully compensate for existing unfair inequalities. This scenario
is particularly relevant in the case of health policy, where public spending coexists with
a large private spending component. We argue that if social justice is not attainable, so-
cial deliberation should not only focus on choosing the circumstances that ought to be
compensated but also reflect on which groups suffering unfair inequalities should be pri-
oritized. Roemer’s proposal is to compensate individuals who are the worst off. However,
this Ralwsian approach ignores the capacity to benefit from the recipients of public help,
a shortcoming that becomes especially problematic in applications to health. Instead, we
propose a framework in which society decides on the weight to place on the potentially
conflicting objectives of helping individuals (or groups) who would benefit the most or
individuals who are the worst off.
The second chapter examines the impact of income-related reporting heterogeneity on
the measurement of health inequality. While most studies of health inequality rely on
self-reported measures of health, recent research has studied the possibility that part of
the existing differences in self-reported health could be due to systematic differences in
reporting across socioeconomic groups. The concern is that part of the existing inequalities
may not be founded on differences in the “true” health status of individuals. In particular,
some studies have concluded that reliance on self-reported health might have resulted in
an overstatement on the degree of health inequality of some countries.
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I study the income-related reporting heterogeneity hypothesis in the 2006 wave of the
Catalan Survey of Health. My hypothesis is that the finding of higher income groups
overstating their “true” health is related to a failure of accounting for health states for peo-
ple suffering from similar conditions. Better living conditions and life styles may result
in health gains that could explain part of the “excess health” reported by higher income
groups. My results indicate that including life style variables in the analysis explains at
least part of the reporting differences across income groups that were previously attributed
to reporting heterogeneity. In the second part of this chapter I examine the contribution
to existing income-related inequality of the factors involved in self-reported health, ac-
counting for life-style differences. I find that the main contributor to health inequality
is the disproportionate concentration of the prevalence the reported conditions in lower
income groups. However, the second largest contributor is the difference in educational
attainment. This finding could be attributed to reporting heterogeneity but an alternative
explanation is that, similar to the case of income, reporting differences might in fact be
capturing underlying differences in objective health statuses.
The third chapter, joint with Hippolyte d’Albis and Loesse Jacques Esso, studies the
trends in mortality convergence across developed countries from 1960 to 2008. While the
epidemiological transition has provided a theory behind the expectation of convergence in
mortality patterns, our results reject the convergence hypothesis for a sample of industrial-
ized countries. We study the disparities across the mortality distributions of the countries
and our sample and find no evidence of convergence towards a common mortality distribu-
tion. After a short period of convergence in the 1960s, countries have diverged for the rest
of the period, with a pronounced increase in the divergence speed at the end of the 1980s.
We show part of the observed increase in differences, especially at the end of the 1980s,
is explained by the trends within former Socialist countries (Eastern countries) in Europe.
Western countries, or countries with no Socialist past, have remarkably stable cross coun-
try differences in mortality patterns. Eastern countries, on the other hand, demonstrate
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convergence up until the 1990s, when they abruptly diverge. Our analysis also reports
that, for both Western and Eastern countries, the relationship between life expectancy and
the variance of the mortality distribution has radically altered over the period. While West-
ern countries have transitioned from a strong negative correlation between life expectancy
and variance to no association, Eastern countries have experienced the opposite evolution.
Taken together, our results lend support to the theories that postulate the importance of
structural conditions that lead to multiple steady-state mortality distributions.
The fourth and final chapter of this dissertation examines the relationship between
unemployment and fertility. I offer a possible explanation for the apparent contradic-
tion between the empirical work that finds a negative relationship between unemployment
and fertility and the theoretical work that emphasizes the lower opportunity cost of child-
bearing while unemployed. I reconcile these perspectives by distinguishing two forms of
unemployment. The first form is structural unemployment while the second is cyclical un-
employment, a less permanent component of unemployment that is linked to the economic
cycle. I study both effects over the life cycle using cohort data on a panel of developed
countries. I find that while structural unemployment has an unambiguous negative effect
on fertility, reactions to cyclical unemployment depend on the age at which it is experi-
enced. Cyclical unemployment has no effect at younger ages and a negative effect at the
end of the fertile life, but it is associated with an increase in fertility in the middle periods.
In the final part of chapter 4, I show how these findings are consistent with a narrative that
emphasizes the role of career considerations in fertility choices. I am able to obtain results
that are coherent with my empirical findings in a model of fertility timing once I account
for career considerations. At younger ages, delaying fertility has a larger impact on future
employability due to the decreasing returns to labor market experience.
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CHAPTER 1
Limited budgets and equality of opportunity in health (with Guillem
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 10
1.1. Introduction
While Roemer’s theory of equality of opportunity (Roemer, 1998) has gained ground
in numerous applications, an unexplored area has been its application to too-real situations
where social justice is not attainable due to resource constraints. We argue that when it is
not possible to achieve full equality of opportunity (EOp), in addition to identifying unfair
sources of inequality, it becomes crucial to decide which groups to target with public
compensation policies. A reason why equality of opportunity might not be attainable is
because EOp policies are likely affected by several factors that disregard the principles
of EOp. In the case of health care, untargeted public provision, such as universal health
care systems, are a primary example of a public policy that does not necessarily contribute
to the achievement of EOp. We show how through the existing inequalities created by
these factors the funds to target EOp can be insufficient and we offer a framework to guide
public choice in these situations.
In our scenario an EOp planner must make the following decision: given a number of
groups of individuals facing unfair inequalities and a dearth of resources to compensate all
individuals, which group should be targeted first? Roemer suggests a Rawlsian approach:
compensate the groups that are worst off. We argue that this choice is not inherent to the
ethical criterion of EOp. Crucially, a critique to his stance is that the resulting allocation
does not account for the effectiveness of the policy in the reduction of unfair inequalities.
Our work shows that accepting Roemer’s formulation of the principle of EOp does not
require implementation according to Rawlsian principles. We contribute to the theory of
EOp by first showing that a separation of the ethical criterion from the method chosen
to allocate the resources is possible while maintaining the core of the EOp criterion. We
propose an allocation method whereby the social decision is broadened vis a vis selecting
targeted groups under an explicit trade-off between efficiency and equity1.
1 Equality of opportunities has been studied according to different definitions by a number of works. For a
comparison between Roemer’s and Van der gaer’s approach see Ooghe, Schokkaert and Van de gaer (2007).
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To contextualize our argument we briefly review Roemer’s proposal. In his book (Roe-
mer, 1998), Roemer formalizes external circumstances and effort, individual responsibil-
ity, and public compensation, in a way that recovers the concept of individual responsibil-
ity. According to his formalization, individuals’ outcomes are attributed to both effort and
circumstances. Roemer proposes effort as the only legitimate source of differences, imply-
ing that inequalities rooted in circumstances should be compensated. Possibly, the major
strength of Roemer’s work is providing a framework for society to consider inequality,
while leaving the responsibility for most of the normative content for society. Many au-
thors have taken advantage of the flexibility of the framework and have applied Roemer’s
strategies for EOp in different fields. These include education (Peragine and Serlenga 2007
and 2009, Bratti 2008, Blanco and Villar 2010), healthcare (Williams and Cookson 2000,
Fleuerbaey and Shockhaert 2009) and development aid (Llavador and Roemer 2001).
Returning to Roemer’s original contribution, the normative choice open to society is
the identification of tolerable sources of inequality; in Roemer’s terminology, this is the
distinction between circumstances and effort. The framework offers a very large degree
of flexibility, since it is possible to encompass, within Roemer’s theoretical construction,
ethical criteria that may be considered to be on opposite ends of conceptions of justice.
We recover utilitarianism when society judges individual outcomes as determined solely
by effort and embrace Rawlsian ideals when outcomes are judged as dependent only on
circumstances.
In this chapter, we regard Roemer’s formalization of EOp as two separate contribu-
tions. First, it defines an ethical criterion based on an intepretation of equality of opportu-
nity: any two individuals exerting the same effort should attain the same level of health.
Second, it offers an allocation method such that a given budget meets EOp. In a context
of scarce resources where social justice according to EOp might not be achievable, the
allocation method allows a stage for identifying which groups to compensate, opening an
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important dimension for social deliberation. We propose a different allocation that ac-
counts for the capacity to benefit of public compensation recipients. The rationale behind
our proposal is that, in the application of EOp, society might also be concerned with the
degree to which groups are expected to improve their health when given public help. We
favour an allocation method based on a tradeoff between compensating the individuals
who are worst off and those who benefit the most. Hence, our proposal effectively extends
society’s choice to cover all aspects of the application of the theory of EOp.
Our work is related to the literature on the so-called bankruptcy problems, which pro-
poses solutions to the allocation of a divisible good2 among agents when the total amount
of the good is insufficient to cover all their demands. Although the problem in the bank-
ruptcy solution literature (for an extensive survey of the literature, see Thompson 2003)
resembles ours to a large extent, our formulation diverges in that we follow Roemer’s
formalization of an EOp ethical criterion. In a similar way, our particular proposal to im-
plement EOp is related to that discussed by Herrero and Villar (1994). The authors present
a method for the allocation of a public budget to different objectives when the available
funds are insufficient to completely satisfy all the objectives. In their work, the authors
study the properties of a number of sharing rules inspired by both the bankruptcy and ax-
iomatic negotiations literatures. An important distinction between our work and the rules
suggested in the bankruptcy literature (and in Herrero and Villar 1994) is that we introduce
concerns for recipients’ capacities to benefit from transfers.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, we formally review the frame-
work for EOp presented in Roemer (1998). The second section is devoted to justifying
our allocation strategy and our priority setting method. Preliminary, we impose further
assumptions on the health state functions and effort decisions. We continue by dividing
between impediments to achieving a fair health status distribution from budgetary restric-
tions and from complexities of the compensation policy. We tackle them separately for
2 The literature tends to focus on divisible goods; nevertheless, for an exploration of the problem under
indivisible goods see Herrero and Martinez (2008)
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clarity. First, in order to convey the basic intuition, we use a simplified case to present
how budgetary limitations might preclude the social planner from achieving EOp in health
regardless of the allocation method. We then illustrate how simple policies can only at-
tain EOp in very specific settings. Since these situations are not the focus of our work,
we offer a modified social objective which allows us to ignore the concerns regarding the
otherwise complexity of the policies. In this modified setting, we present the derivation of
our allocation method and discuss how the choice of different metrics allows us to cover
the full spectrum of social decisions regarding which groups to intervene.
1.2. The formalization of EOp
In this section we briefly introduce basic elements of the theory of EOp. The problem,
in short, is the following. Consider a set of individuals who can achieve a certain health
status (or any other relevant dimension of welfare). Suppose the health status is a function
of the amount of health care consumed by individuals, the effort they exert (individually),
and their circumstances. Our goal is to decide on the distribution of a given public budget
across individuals to achieve a health status distribution which meets the ethical criteria of
EOp.
The basis of EOp’s normative structure lies precisely in the distinction between cir-
cumstances and effort, which we elaborate in this section. Define circumstances to be that
which society judges beyond the responsibility of the individual. Effort is constituted by
all the actions that society judges as within the responsibility of the individual. It follows
from the characterization of circumstances, that we may create a classification of individ-
uals by types. A type is a subset of individuals who share the same circumstances relevant
to the attainment of health. We can imagine this to be anything from their genetical pre-
disposition to illnesses, education or their capacity to benefit from treatment, etc.
We denote = {1, . . . ,T} as the set of T types in which we divide population. The
relationship between resources, effort and health is given by the health status function. The
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health status of an individual is a function of the effort and resources allocated, indexed
by the type.
We denote ut (x,e) as the health status function for type t, where x are the resources
and e is the effort3. As stated before, society must choose an allocation of health care
spending (potentially) dependent on effort and type. While we know that the aim of the
policy is to attain EOp, let it be for now any rule which satisfies the following definition:
DEFINITION 1. (Policy) A policy is a T-tuple of functions which specify, for each
type, the resources devoted as a function of effort. We denote it φ =
(
φ1, . . . ,φT
)
and
call each function φ t an allocation rule. Then, φ t (e) is the amount of resources a type t
individual receives if she exerts effort e.
It is then reasonable to believe, in turn, that the effort exerted by individuals is depen-
dent on the policy. Given a policy, the individuals of a given type t generate a distribution
of effort, given by a cumulative probability function Ftφ t ; F
t
φ t (e) is the cumulated prob-
ability up to and including e. In some cases we may assume that effort has a discrete
probability distribution, in others we assume a continuous distribution with a convex sup-
port, say an interval (infinite or not) with a density function f tφ t .
We now specify the notation for the budget constraint. Let ω be the per capita dispos-
able resources. The amount of (per capita) resources assigned to type t is
ω t =∑
e
φ t (e)P(e) or ω t =
ˆ
R
φ t (e) dFtφ t (e)
depending on whether effort is a discrete or a continuous variable. Denote α t the
proportion of type t in the population. Then the global constraint is
3 Indexing by type is equivalent to including another variable or vector of variables which includes type
characteristics, i.e., u(C,x,e), where C is the vector of individual characteristics that constitute a type (see
Roemer, 2002 for a complete exposition of this notation).
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(1.2.1) ω =∑
t
α tω t .
Let ρ t = ω t/ω be the per capita share of the resource for type t. Then ∑t ρ t = 1.
A key contribution by Roemer is in formalizing a method to justly compare the effort
exerted by different types. Given that the effort distribution is influenced by the circum-
stances, how can we fairly compare the amount of effort between different types? A
solution is to draw a distinction between the level and the degree of effort as formalized in
this definition.
DEFINITION 2. (Effort level, effort degree and indirect advantage) For π ∈ (0,1), let
et (π,φ t) be the level of effort exerted by an individual of the type t in the πth quantile of
effort of the type . We call π a degree of effort. These levels and degrees are characterized
by the equations
π =
ˆ et(π,φ t)
0
dFtφ t , t ∈ 
in the case of continuous effort distribution, and similarly for the discrete case.
The indirect health status function gives the health status of an individual of type t
receiving the resources determined by the policy φ and exerting the π degree of effort of
the type distribution of effort, and is defined by
vt
(
π,φ t
)
= ut
(
φ t
(
et
(
π,φ t
))
,et
(
π,φ t
))
The main idea of the concept of equality of opportunity is that we should be comparing
individuals according to their degree of effort and not their level, which is influenced by
their circumstances. We formalize this ethical criterion in the following definition.
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DEFINITION 3. (Social criteria and strong social justice) The ethical criterion of equal-
ity of opportunity (EOp) states that given any two individuals, independent of type, exert-
ing the same degree of effort (individuals in the same position in their respective type
distributions), they must achieve the same level of advantage. That is,
(1.2.2) ∀i, j ∈ , ∀π ∈ (0,1) , vi (π,φ i)= v j (π,φ j)
By strong social justice according to a given criterion we indicate, the state in which
the advantages of all individuals satisfy the requirements of the chosen ethical criterion,
in this case, EOp.
Having defined the fair distribution of health status, the remaining question is how
to design policies that achieve that social objective. Roemer proceeds in the following
manner. In his presentation, he refers to EOp as in definition 3 (1.2.2). However, when
implementating EOP — i.e. the choice of policy — Roemer defines the resulting pol-
icy from his proposed methodology as an EOp policy regardless of whether it actually
achieves the EOp in definition 3. In a sense, one could argue that Roemer has made EOp
a criterion subsidiary to the allocation method, as what is actually treated as EOp is the
outcome of his rule for choosing the policy.
While one may accept his proposed method, which is presented in the remaining of
the section, it does not follow directly from the theory of EOp. In other words, a society
that accepts the normative criterion of definition 3 does not need to support the ethical
choices inherent to his proposed method. This is where our contribution lies. While we
accept EOp as a criterion, we propose a different methodology to guide the choice of
policies. When we refer to EOp, we are considering the criterion in definition 3. This
allows for the possibility that EOp is not actually achieved, something that is otherwise
ruled out by the nature of Roemer’s procedure. If we proceed according to this separation
of ethical criterion and method, we can still discuss Roemer’s rule for a choice of policy
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as a particular method. Recall that we seek a distribution of resources that leads to the
achievement of EOp. Ideally, we aim at meeting this criterion for every percentile of
effort, whereby all types accomplish the same level of advantage. The method proposed
by Roemer is the maximization of the minimum advantage among types for every π of
effort.
max
φ
min
t∈T
vt
(
π,φ t
)
Note that this allocation method is Rawlsian in its conception. It centers the attention
on the type that is worst off, for every π of effort. This is the essence of Roemer’s im-
plementation and what follows are technical considerations. Given limitations on the so-
phistication of the implementation policy, the solution to the program for a given quantile
might not correspond with the solution that equalizes the advantage among other quan-
tiles. Therefore, we encounter the problem of potentially obtaining as many policies as
quantiles. The proposed solution consists of assigning a weight equivalent to the pop-
ulation weight for every quantile and solving for this modified problem. Effectively, it
concedes the same importance to every quantile, so in this sense, it becomes utilitarianist
across quantiles.
(1.2.3) max
φ
ˆ 1
0
min
t∈T
vt
(
π,φ t
)
dπ
The remaining part of the chapter is devoted to constructing and justifying our pro-
posed allocation method.
1.3. Preliminaries
In this section we want to explore why is it that EOp might not be achieved and why
this is particularly relevant in applications to health. We begin with the justification of the
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relevance of our proposal. Suppose first that EOp cannot be achieved, disregarding the
reason. The main concern that motivates our contribution is that the Rawlsian approach
to the choice of policy proposed in Roemer’s original contribution is particularly ill-suited
for health applications. This is because it excludes any consideration over the capacity to
benefit from health care of the individuals to be treated among those facing unfair inequal-
ities. In the extreme case where the type that is the worst off cannot improve with medical
treatment, using 1.2.3 would still lead to allocating the entirety of the budget to this type.
This is a criticism made to all the methods based on Ralwsian inspiration; interestingly,
this precise point was raised by Harsanyi (1975) in his critique to Rawls’ maxmin. The
following example, part of Harsanyi’s text, illustrates our critique.
As a first example, consider a society consisting of one doctor and two patients, where
both patients are critically ill with pneumonia. Their only chance for recovery is via
antibiotic treatment, but the amount of treatment available is sufficient for treatment of
only one patient. Of these two patients, individual A is an otherwise healthy person (apart
from his present attack of pneumonia). On the other hand, individual B is a terminal
cancer victim whose life would be prolonged by merely several months, given treatment of
the antibiotic. Which patient should be given the antibiotic? According to the difference
principle, it should be given to the cancer victim, who is obviously the less fortunate of the
two patients.
It is important to note that while one might reject 1.2.3 , this does not invalidate EOp
as an ethical principle since 1.2.3 is not the unique program that implements EOp. Recog-
nizing this fact, we propose abandoning the pure Ralwsian program and to instead design
policies based on a more flexible framework. While society might be concerned with the
well-being of types that are the worst off, the capacity to benefit should be a key compo-
nent behind the adoption of a given policy. Our contribution is to allow society to choose
the particular weight given to both potentially conflicting objectives in the program that
obtains the EOp implementing policy. However, before we describe our proposal in detail,
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we clarify why we think it is most reasonable to assume that EOp cannot be achieved in
the majority of applications.
In several contexts and most certainly in the case of health care policy, individuals
have a starting level of advantage (health endowments or health gained by income, for ex-
ample) that is not distributed following ethical considerations. The origin of these initial
differences can be traced to a variety of factors. In the case of health these might be behav-
ioral or biological reasons, such health related habits or genetics. Without disregarding the
importance of such factors, in this chapter, we emphasize the role of health care spending
in creating initial differences in health status. Regardless of the amount devoted within the
health budget to the pursuit of EOp, there is bound to be a large fraction of total spending
allocated without regard to the ethical principle of EOp. One might think of high income
elasticity private spending on expensive healthy food, free time for exercise, health edu-
cation and lower opportunity costs for prevention for certain groups; or public spending,
perhaps with a universalist flavor, that is allocated on different premises. Regardless of
the source of these initial differences in health status accross types, it is entirely possi-
ble and even reasonable to think that it might not be feasible to fully compensate those
unfair inequalities with the budget allocated to EOp policies. It is in such context when
the choice of a EOp implementing program becomes relevant. As an aside, another rea-
son why strong social justice (according to EOp) might not be a feasible state is technical
in nature. As explained in the previous section, there could be a conflict between EOp
achieving policies. When the complexity of the policy is limited, this is more likely to
become an issue. We illustrate this point later on for the case of policies that only depend
on the type. In this section, we explore separately both reasons why a EOp distribution
might not be feasible separately before we turn to our proposal.
1.3.1. Assumptions. Throughout the remainder of the chapter, we assume the fol-
lowing regarding effort decisions, advantage function, and behavior of individuals.
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(1) Achievement functions ut (x,e) are defined for all nonnegative values of their
arguments, unbounded for any fixed positive value of any of its arguments, and
twice differentiable with continuity, i.e. C2 functions. First partial derivatives are
strictly positive and second derivatives with respect to the same argument twice
are strictly negative.
(2) Both resources and effort are necessary and sufficient for obtaining a positive
achievement: ut (x,e) = 0 if and only if x = 0 or e = 0.
(3) The assignment policy is determined by Roemer’s method, so it is the optimal
solution of (1.2.3) when all resources are allocated. Furthermore, we restrict to
constant policies.
(4) Denote e∗ the individual choice of effort of any given type. Then, effort depends
positively on the amount of resources allocated to this type: ∀x, de∗dx > 0 .
We clarify here the extent to which our assumptions are restrictive. Our first assumption is
mainly technical, as it states that the health status function is well-behaved. However, we
also assume that there is no upper bound to how much health can ameliorate with health
care. That is, we allow for different capacities to benefit, but we assume that even though
some individuals may have an arbitrarily small capacity to translate health care spending
into a better health status, it is always possible to improve their health. The second assump-
tion states that health status requires a positive amount of resources, but we do not require
the resources to be fully determined by the social planner. Resources may originate from
other public interventions (not aimed at achieving EOp), privately by individuals (“other
resources”), or as allocated by the social planner. We do impose a restrictive assump-
tion further along by requiring “other resources” to be unaffected by the social planner
to obtain EOp. This simplifying assumption precludes important considerations such as
crowding-out of private resources.
We restrict to constant policies in our exercise. While our message would remain
mostly unchanged by allowing for more complicated policies, we choose to restrict our
1.3. PRELIMINARIES 21
analysis to compensation policies that only depend on the type for two main reasons.
First, this simplifies the presentation of our proposal and it presents our results under the
realistic assumption that the policy space is much restricted. This could be because of the
feasibility constraints related to its implementation or because of some political economy
reasons. Finally, our most restrictive assumption states that allocating more resources to
a type or group of individuals does not imply that the group will exert less effort. For
the purposes of our exercise, we assume that the group of individuals will exert more
effort. This is important for our implementation method since we rely on the possibility
of achieving social justice. If agents diminish their efforts in a way that fully offsets
the advantage gains garnered from allocation of further resources, our method would no
longer result in a well-defined problem. Our claim, however, is that our implementation
method can be applied even if there is some “crowding out” as long as there is an arbitrarily
large public budget such that social justice can be attained. That is, that achieving EOp is
feasible. We think that it would be far-fetched to assume otherwise, since it would imply
the rather extreme vision that individuals would simply undo the public compensating
effort by reducing their effort.
1.3.2. Insufficient budget. We present the context of an insufficient budget. In order
to focus solely on this issue, we present a limit case by ruling out the possibility of conflicts
in the policies required by each quantile by assuming a single level of effort for each
type (although not necessarily the same level across types). That is, the distribution of
effort is characterized by a single effort for each type with the immediate implication that
EOp is achieved by completely equalizing advantages across types. This is the simplest
scenario where the availability of public funds represents a limitation in the achievement
of EOp. We want to emphasize that we use this simplistic scenario strictly for presentation
purposes, as our proposal does not rely on single effort by type distributions. In fact, this
is an assumption we abandon later on. Having established the aim of our exercise, suppose
now that all the resources available for individuals are publicly provided and distributed
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according to the ethical objective of EOp. Then, as we formalize in proposition 1, strong
social justice is always achieved in our context.
PROPOSITION 4. Let each type have a unique nonzero effort level. Then, under as-
sumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, strong social justice is achieved.
PROOF. Under a single effort level for a given type, functions vt are now simply
vt
(
φ t
)
= ut
(
φ t,et
(
φ t
))
where et(φ t) denotes the effort level applied by all individuals of type t as a response
to receiving φ t resources. By assumption 4, vt as a function of its single argument is
monotonic and strictly increasing with continuity. It can be shown that, if two types have
different advantages, it is possible to reassign resources to reduce the difference. To re-
assign: choose i, j such that vi(φ i) is the minimum among all types and v j(φ j) is the
maximum among types. Since functions vt are continuous and increasing, there exists
δ > 0 such that
vi
(
φ i
)
< vi
(
φ i+δα i
)
< v j
(
φ j −δα j)< v j (φ j) .
Then we can adjust φ i by φ i + δα i and φ j by φ j − δα j to obtain a new policy that still
satisfies the global constraint (1.2.1). It may be that several types share the same minimum
given by v j
(
φ j
)
. To achieve a policy that improves Roemer’s criterion, reassignment may
require repeating the application. 
What poses a threat to the achievement of EOp is the existence of initial differences,
not the availability of budgetary resources per se. After all, if types did not have initial
levels of health, it would always be possible to equalize them at the bottom by assigning
zero advantage for all of them. Proposition 1 formalizes the idea that in the absence of
initial levels of health, EOp is achieved regardless of the budget.
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Assume now that the types have some initial health status independent of the policy
selected. We consider the case where this is due to some arbitrary initial assignment of
resources that is given without necessarily respecting any justice requirement. It can be
interpreted as public funds distributed in a previous stage according to some other criterion
(for instance, utilitarism), as privately-provided resources (for instance, provisions by the
family) or a combination of both. Regardless of the origin, we assume that all types hold
some initial amount of resources (with at least one amount strictly positive) and that this
does not depend on posterior public resources allocated. Then, in our context, it is strictly
a matter of the the size of the public budget whether EOp can be reached or not.
PROPOSITION 5. Let each type have a unique nonzero effort level. Then, under as-
sumptions 1 and 2 and a given nonnegative initial assigment xt0, t ∈ T (where at least one
assignment is positive, and at least one is zero), there are values ωS and ωL for the amount
of resources to be assigned such that the following hold.
(i) For ω < ωS, equality of achievement among types is unattainable.
(ii) For ω ≥ ωL, strong social justice is achieved.
(iii) If strong social justice has been achieved (all types have equal advantage) any
marginal increment of resources is distributed such that
∀i, j ∈ T, ∂u
i
∂x
dφ i
dω
+
∂ui
∂e
dei
dφ i
dφ i
dω
=
∂u j
∂x
dφ j
dω
+
∂u j
∂e
de j
dφ j
dφ j
dω
.
PROOF. If (i) were false, letting ω go to zero will give us equality of advantages among
ut
(
xt0+0,e
t) with some xt0 positive and some zero; this is impossible given assumption
2. To prove (ii), apply proposition 4 with advantage functions ut∗ (x,e) = u
(
xt0+ x,e
)−
u
(
xt0,e
)
. We have a budget ω∗ with equality of achievements that we may assume to be the
minimal one. Then, take ωL = ω∗+∑t xt0. (iii) follows by differentiating with respect to
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ω (using the chain rule) the equality ui
(
φ i,ei
(
φ i
))
= u j
(
φ j,e j
(
φ j
))
(see proof of prop.
4) where now φ t = φ t (ω). 
We extract a number of valuable insights from proposition 2. First, the amount public
funds available matters for the equality of achievements. Second, once a state of strong
social justice is reached, further resources are allocated so that every type obtains a share.
The size of the portion depends on the ability of types of transforming resources into
achievement. This last point is insightful and we build our modification around it. Intu-
itively, if all types receive some share of an hypothetical marginal increment of resources,
it should mean that we are as close as possible to social justice. Otherwise, the additional
funds would be channeled to those types experiencing unfair inequalities. Having charac-
terized the issue of the scarcity of resources to the extent that is needed for our exercise,
we now turn to the problem posed by limitations on the complexity of the policy.
1.3.3. Simplicity of the policy. In the presentation of his method, Roemer addresses
the possibility of conflicts in the policies necessary to obtain strong social justice for every
given quantile. In our context, this is the second main reason why strong social justice
might not be achieved. In this part we exclude initial differences in resources and focus
on illustrating the problems posed by restricting to the particular case of constant policies.
Our motivation is that in a context of limitations on the availability of information to
design compensation schemes, we believe there is a gain in designing a method that works
under the simplest possible policies. We find that very stringent requirements are needed
to be able to attain the ethical objective if we restrict ourselves to constant policies when
dealing with multiple efforts. Through Example 6, we show how, under very particular
homotheticity properties between both types and quantiles of effort, strong social justice
is attained. We provide the example as an illustration of the degree to which special
circumstances are necessary to completely fulfill the desired ethical criterion.
EXAMPLE 6. Assume:
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(i) There are just two types t = A,B each with a continuum of effort levels, and achieve-
ment functions of the form ut (ϕ,e) = λ tϕα t e1−α t .
(ii) There is a policy ϕ that assigns a constant amount of resources ϕA +ϕB = 1 (to-
tal amount of resources per capita is normalized to 1) and achieves strong social justice
(equality of indirect achievements), that is ∀π ∈ (0,1) , vA (π,ϕA)= vB (π,ϕB).
Then, the frontier of advantages is homothetic on the quantiles. If etπ denotes the π
quantile in the effort distribution of type t,
(1.3.1) ∀φ ∈ (0,1) , ∀π,π ′ ∈ (0,1) , u
A (φ ,eAπ)
uB (1−φ ,eBπ)
=
uA
(
φ ,eAπ ′
)
uB
(
1−φ ,eBπ ′
)
Furthermore, this assumption forces the effort quantiles by eAπ = c1
(
eBπ
) c2 for some con-
stants c1, c2.
PROOF. Simple substitution of ut into the social justice condition 1.3.1 gives
(
eBπ
)1−αB = λA
(
ϕA
)αA
λB (ϕB)αB
(
eAπ
)
1−αA
and this gives both results. 
We do not wish to restrict our contribution to such special cases nor relax our restric-
tions on policies, so our strategy is to develop a weaker definition of social justice as an
objective. In particular, we relax the requirements on the definition of social justice by
only accepting differences that arise from the simplicity of the policy.
1.4. The method
In application, the feasible level of complexity of policies may become an issue. We
tackle this problem by proposing a weakened version of strong social justice which is
enough for our objective. Namely, we consider a new social objective in which only
inequalities derived from the simplicity of the policy are tolerated. To that effect, recall
that proposition 2 establishes that all types receive a positive amount any marginal increase
1.4. THE METHOD 26
in available public funds once social justice is met. We build our new definition of social
justice around this notion by defining a state of weak social justice in which all types
receive a share of any marginal increase in the public budget. In the particular situation
where proposition 2 is established, this coincides with the achievement of strong social
justice. This is no longer the case when given multiple levels of effort. However, it is
still possible to find an amount of resources (total budget) such that by using Roemer’s
allocation method, all types obtain a portion of a marginal increase of the public funds.
By choosing Roemer’s implementation, we relax our definition of social justice in the
same way that Roemer did in his contribution. However, as emphasized earlier, we depart
from Roemer in allowing only for differences in advantage arising from the simplicity
our policy. We maintain that given exogenous initial differences across types, our relaxed
version of social justice might not be achieved. The formalization of this explanation is
given in the following definition.
DEFINITION 7. (Sufficient budget and weak social justice): Assume the policy is de-
cided by solving Roemer’s program. A sufficient budget is such that, for any budget in
excess of the sufficient budget, all types would receive a strictly larger assignment under
the decided policy associated with the larger budget. Formally, a total budget ω is suf-
ficient, if, for all types t and for all ω¯ > ω , φ tω¯ > φ tω , where φω denotes the assignment
under the optimal policy in assumption 3. Denote as weak social justice the state in which
the total budget is at least sufficient.
The definition captures the intuition that if every type receives a share of the additional
resource pie, it is not possible to move closer to the social justice state. Therefore, a total
budget is sufficient if it compensates for initial inequalities among types. We now prove
that such a budget exists under fairly general conditions.
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PROPOSITION 8. Under assumptions 1 , 2 , 3 and 4 and a compact support effort
distribution for each type (or finite number of values if effort levels are discrete), there
exists a (finite) sufficient budget.
PROOF. With these assumptions, functions vt (π,φ t) are continuous and non decreas-
ing in both arguments, not bounded on the second argument but bounded for π ∈ [0,1].
Function v(π,Φ)=mint vt (π,φ t) also has these properties. Function R(ω)=maxΦ
´ 1
0 v(π,Φ)dπ
is increasing and not bounded as ω grows.
If Φ = Φω is the optimal policy for a budget ω , a type t has φ t = 0 if and only if
vt (π,φ tω)> v(π,Φω) for all values of π except possible for some isolated ones. This may
occur either because type t has some initial assignment xt0 or because the distribution of
effort does not contain the zero effort. The only case where φ tω does not increase when ω
grows is when φ tω = 0.
Now we proceed by induction on the number of types T . For T = 1 the proposition is
clearly true. For T , choose a budget ω0 large enough to be a sufficient budget for types
t = 1, . . . ,T − 1 while also satisfying v(π,Φω0) > vT (π,0) for all π in some interval of
positive length. This is also a sufficient budget for all types. 
Having proved existence, we select a particular sufficient budget. Recall, we seek to
approach weak social justice using our selected policy. However, this new and more lax
requirement of social justice could be achieved by a number of budgets. Our natural choice
of budget, which in turn characterizes the advantages in a particular weak social justice
state, is that which requires the least amount of resources.
DEFINITION 9. (Minimum sufficient budget): Given initially allocated resources xt ≥ 0,
whereby some are positive, the infimum of all socially acceptable budgets is defined as the
minimum sufficient budget and the corresponding optimal policy is defined as the minimum
sufficient policy (note that this is also a sufficient budget).
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How do we choose a policy when the budget is short of a sufficient budget? Roemer’s
method remains valid; however, it presumes priority for compensating types that are the
worst off, a judgement that is not implied by EOp. We propose a method that allows
society to decide which types to compensate by taking a stand on the tradeoff between the
effectiveness of the public intervention and helping the worst off. We denote the choice
in allocation resulting from society’s stand on the effeciency-equity tradeoff in a socially-
selected policy. Formally, we suggest that, given an insufficient budget, we can obtain our
policy from the minimization of the distance to the state of weak social justice generated
by the minimum sufficient policy. What follows is a formal exposition of our method .
Let ω0 be the minimum sufficient budget for a given set of initially allocated resources
{xt}, let φ0 be the corresponding minimum sufficient policy , and let vt (π,φ0) the as-
sociated indirect achievement functions. We denote by v(π,φ0) the vector of all types’
achievements for degree π . For a smaller budget ω we say that the socially-selected pol-
icy is the solution for the program
(1.4.1) min
φ
ˆ 1
0
‖v(π,φ0)−v(π,φ)‖p dπ
where ‖.‖p denotes a norm (see below) that measures the distance to the minimum
sufficient policy and v(π,φ) is the vector of achievements under policy φ .
It is clear that the choice of distance has profound implications on the resulting policy.
Consider a p-norm; then, 1.4.1 becomes
(1.4.2) min
φ
ˆ 1
0
(
t
∑
t=1
∣∣vt (π,φ0)− vt (π,φ t)∣∣p
) 1
p
dπ
It is desirable to formulate the problem in this fashion as every metric comprised in
the p-norm corresponds to a choice of weights in the trade off between effectiveness of
1.4. THE METHOD 29
public resources and compensating those who are worse off. For instance, for p= 1, 1.4.2
becomes the minimization of the sum of differences.
min
φ
ˆ 1
0
(
t
∑
t=1
∣∣vt (π,φ0)− vt (π,φ t)∣∣
)
dπ
The choice of this metric entails a utilitarian policy or simply, targeting the type that
could benefit the most. At the margin, resources are allocated to the type with a larger
partial derivative of the advantage function with respect to resources. Since in general,
there is no guarantee that an interior solution is achieved, this could lead to abandoning
types with lower abilities to transform resources into advantage.
On the other extreme, when p → ∞, 1.4.2 is then:
min
φ
ˆ 1
0
(
max
t
∣∣vt (π,φ0)− vt (π,φ t)∣∣)dπ
The solution allocates resources to types farther away from the minimum sufficient
policy advantages, disregarding any consideration regarding the effectiveness of the pub-
lic funds .We acknowledge, however, a non-desired consequence that follows from our
definition of weak social justice. We cannot prove that in general, when limited to sim-
ple constant policies, our sufficient policy leads to the equality of achievements for every
quantile across types4.
1.4.1. Discussion. We have assumed in this chapter the standard case of a continuous
achievement function; this might be considered a limitation of our proposal as many ap-
plications require considering categorical data such as health states. This issue has been
studied in recent work that has explored extensions of the EOp framework categorical
data (Herrero and Villar 2012). Our methodology extends to these situations as well;
4 Through our example 1 we have shown that in general, when limited to simple constant policies, there
is no guarantee that our sufficient policy leads to the equality of achievements for every quantile across
types.There can be quantiles for given types that result in higher levels of achievement than others, leading
to the counterintuitive result that a Ralwsian policy would prioritize their compensations. This is entirely
a result based on the limitations we have imposed to our policy and its actual relevance depends on how
different advantages are in weak social justice.
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when dealing with categorical data, our method requires minimizing the distance to the
proportion, for each category and type, that is in accordance to the weakened definition of
EOp.
On a more general note, a critique leveled against EOp is that it does not include
the traditional tradeoff between efficiency and equity. Our work includes considerations
regarding efficiency in the application of EOp, but only related to the attainment of social
justice. Hence we acknowledge the possibility that pursuing the optimal policies according
to our method could be inefficient from a broader standpoint. Nevertheless, we conceive
the framework of EOp as providing the guidelines for the design of the policies of a public
authority in charge exclusively of the attainment of equity. That is not to say that society,
at a broader level, might still be allocating its resources considering the traditional balance
between efficiency and equity. In the case of health care, for instance, the relevant ministry
might devote part of its budget to reduce avoidable mortality and some other fraction to
equitable access. Our proposal is addressed exclusively at the latter objective.
1.5. Conclusion
We have argued that full capacity of decision over the normative content of the theory
of equality of opportunity formulated by Roemer (1998) requires transfering the decision
power over its allocation method. In order to apply the theory it is not only relevant for
society to establish the legitimacy of inequalities; when the scarcity of resources results
in the impossibility of attaining equality of opportunity, it is also crucial to decide which
types to compensate first. In this work, we outlined the conditions under which this con-
cern matters, namely when public funds are insufficient to compensate for initial differ-
ences across types. In this context, Roemer’s original proposal advocates for a Rawlsian
approach prioritizing redistribution towards groups that are the worst off. Our critique is
that this approach neglects consideration of targeted individuals’ capacities to benefit from
transfers, something that is crucial in applications to health care.
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We then present a new allocation method based on the intuitive idea of the minimiza-
tion to an unattainable objective. Through the choice of different metrics, our methodology
allows inclusion, with varying importance, of the weight attached to the potentially con-
flicting objectives of compensating the types that are worst of and types that can benefit
the most. The main contribution of this chapter is, therefore, to extend the framework of
EOp to allow societal control of the application of equality of opportunities.
CHAPTER 2
Reporting heterogeneity or better health? Revising the
income-related reporting heterogeneity hypothesis
32
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2.1. Introduction
Researchers and policymakers often rely on self-reported health measures to assess
health inequality. Part of the popularity of self reported health indicators is due to the
fact that they are relatively inexpensive to collect and, despite the debate over their accu-
racy (Baker, Stabile and Deri, 2004), have been shown to be a reasonably good predictor
of health utilization (van Doorslaer, Koolman and Jones, 2004) and mortality (Idler and
Benyamini, 1997 and 1999, van Doorslaer and Gerdtham, 2003, and Jürges, 2008). Even
when reliable information on objective health measures is available, such as the conditions
suffered by the individual, methods that map objective health variables onto overall health
status incorporate are often based on revealed preferences (Dolan, 2000).
A concern surrounding self reported health measures is that they are not based exclu-
sively on underlying “true” health but rather incorporate reporting heterogeneity across
individuals. In this work, I investigate whether there are indeed systematic differences in
self-reported health across socioeconomic groups. My main finding is that at least part
of the observed differences in reporting across socieconomic groups can be attributable
to unaccounted differences in “true” health. Understanding this type of difference is par-
ticularly relevant because of the policy and research focus on the socioeconomic gradient
of health. Arguably, health inequality evaluations should only consider differences in the
“true” health status of individuals and hence we must account for reporting heterogeneity
by socieconomic group.
This is not a new question; there exists an extensive literature that has investigated the
validity of self-reported measures of health and, in particular, its effect on health inequal-
ity evaluations. There exist a plethora of works that evaluate the accuracy and utility of
self-reported measures of health. While it is generally accepted that self-reported health
measures are correlated with objective indicators of health, the debate over their accuracy
has resulted in some recent works turning to vignettes as an alternative methodology to
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finding objective measures of health. This method has been deemed particularly appro-
priate in the context of developing countries (Bago d’Uva, van Doorslaer, Lindeboom and
O’Donell, 2008), but has also been used in studies in the United States (Dowd and Todd,
2011) and in European countries (Bago d’Uva, O’Donnell and van Doorslaer, 2008).
Finally, the strand of the literature most closely related to this work has focused on
studying individual reported health1 and finds reporting heterogeneity using surveys that
contain both self-reported health variables and “objective” measures of health, such as
self-reported incidence of health conditions. It is important to note that these “objec-
tive” measures of health have been found to be somehow inaccurate (Baker, Stabile and
Deri, 2004) and subject to income related reporting heterogeneity (Johnston, Propper and
Shields, 2009). However, self-reported incidence is considered to be relatively more reli-
able in developed countries, given the improved likelihood of diagnosis. Interestingly, the
results of this literature are mixed with regards to the direction of the self-reporting bias.
Sen (2002) compares life expectancy and self reported morbidity across two Indian states
and the United States. Surprisingly, reported morbidity is positively associated with life
expectancy; this is something that he labels as a “health paradox”. Dowd and Zajacova
(2010) use education instead to represent socioeconomic status and also find evidence of
heterogeneity in the association between objective health (as measured by biomarkers)
and self reported health measures. Their findings suggest that reporting heterogeneity
leads to an understatement of the health socioeconomic gradient. On the other hand, van
Doorslaer and Humphries (2000) find that higher income groups report relatively smaller
declines in health as their health status worsens, which implies that researchers could be
overstating socioeconomic health inequalities. Etilé and Milcent (2006) also find evidence
of understatement of health declines by higher income groups.
This work is closest to these last papers in that it combines measures of subjective
and objective health to assess reporting heterogeneity. I study the reporting heterogeneity
1 Reporting heterogeneity has also been studied in other dimensions. For example, (Jürges, 2008) finds
evidence of cross-country heterogeneity.
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hypothesis using data from the Catalan Survey of Health (ESCA, in Catalan) survey that
covers individual reports on health, socioeconomic variables, information on conditions
suffered, other measures of health (such as the body mass index), and on individual’s
life styles. My hypothesis is that part of the finding that high income groups overstate
their objective health is at least partially explained by the failure to properly account for
differences in health states by people suffering from similar conditions. Indeed, higher
income groups may in fact have better health despite suffering from the same conditions.
Better care, living conditions and life styles might result in health gains from palliative
care which could explain the apparent over reporting observed by income.
To assess this possibility, I test if reporting heterogeneity is robust to the introduction
of variables that reflect better self care such as smoking and exercising (also self reported).
In some of my specifications the terms capturing reporting heterogeneity by income group
disappear, lending support to my hypothesis that differences in reporting across income
groups might in fact reflect true differences in health. I then decompose the observed
socioeconomic inequality in health into five components: i) the different prevalence of
conditions across socioeconomic groups and other objective health measures, ii) differ-
ences across occupational statuses, iii) age a gender iv) the effect of education groups,
and v) a final part based on differences in life styles. The results of my exercise indicates
that, while differences in objective health measures are the largest source of inequality,
education variables are also responsible for a substantial amount of health inequalities.
2.2. Data
I use data from the ESCA from the year 20062. The ESCA covers variables on so-
cioeconomic status such as education, occupation, income, self reported health measures,
a wide array of conditions, life style variables and health service utilization. Table A1 (in
2 The year 2006 is particularly appropriate for our exercise because unemployment is relatively low com-
pared to more recent waves that have unemployment levels well above the 20% mark. Given the evidence
on the relationship between unemployment and health (Roelfs, Shor, Davidson and Schwartz, 2011), this
could distort my results.
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the appendix) is a full list of the variables used in this study. It is noteworthy to clarify that,
in the survey, questions regarding conditions are asked in a very general manner that does
not allow the researcher to distinguish the severity with which the condition is suffered by
the respondent.
For instance, the below question is asked in the survey:
• Could you tell us if you suffer or have suffered from any of the chronic conditions
that I will proceed to read? (In the original Catalan: Ens podria dir si pateix o ha
patit algun dels trastorns crònics que ara li llegiré?)
The variable for income is categorical, which is problematic for the computation of the
concentration index, which is the measure I use for the decomposition of health inequality
(Chen and Roy, 2009). To address this, I create a continuous variable as follows. First, I
estimate a model that explains income group affiliation as a function of the rest of socioe-
conomic variables. Then, I assign continuous income as the expected income resulting
from multiplying the probability of belonging to each of two adjacent groups by the midle
point of the income bracket they represent.
2.3. Methods
2.3.1. Testing the hypothesis. In order to test my hypothesis that apparent reporting
heterogeneity by income might be due to higher income groups having better objective
health, I estimate two different models. The first model explains self-reported health as a
function of income, other socioeconomic variables, incidence of conditions and the inter-
action between income and objective health variables. Reporting heterogeneity is captured
by both the coefficients on income and on the interaction between income and objective
health variables. While both terms capture reporting heterogeneinty by income group,
their interpretation is different. A significant and positive main effect of income implies
that, for the same reported objective health, higher income groups report better health. The
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interaction signals that income groups react in terms of reporting to variation in objective
health.
In the second model I introduce variables of self care. In particular, I consider smoking
status and the frequency of physical activity. If the terms signaling self reporting hetero-
geneity were simply capturing differences in objective health within people suffering the
same conditions, I expect them to no longer appear significant. Given the number of con-
ditions in the survey, estimating the interactions between all the conditions and income
would result in a very large number of parameters. Instead, I construct health indices with
a principle components analysis (PCA)3 on the twenty four conditions of the survey. PCA
helps reduce the high dimensionality of the problem by exploiting the correlation between
the different conditions, which can be considered “redundant” information. Instead of in-
cluding the set of X conditions, which are highly correlated, I use the first five PC that are
by construction orthogonal to each other.
Table 1 reports the correlations between conditions and the first five principle com-
ponents (PC) and the variance captured by each component. The first five components
explain roughly 40% of the variance. In my analysis, I report the results for models that
consider from one to five components. The first PC is the easiest to interpret since it is pos-
itively correlated with all the conditions; it creates a divide between respondents who are
healthy and unhealthy. The remaining components are more difficult to interpret as they
contain both positive and negative associations with the different conditions. For example,
the second PC is positively correlated with prostrate conditions and negatively correlated
with arthrosis and migraines, a combination of conditions most likely to be found in men.
The third PC is heavily correlated with respiratory conditions, such as asthma and chronic
pulmonary conditions. In the case of the forth component the dominant (and positively
correlated) conditions are “ulcera”, prostate, cancer and skin conditions. The fifth and last
PC is strongly correlated with reporting having suffered a stroke.
3 While PCA analysis is not recommended on categorical data, the case of binary dummy variables is special
Gower, 1966)
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TABLE 1. Principle components
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5
Hyptertension 0.48 0.21 -0.31 -0.15 -0.20
Diabitis 0.36 0.30 -0.26 -0.23 -0.02
Heart 0.46 0.27 -0.16 -0.12 0.25
Asthrosis 0.57 -0.19 0.01 0.01 -0.30
Asthma 0.25 0.31 0.69 -0.24 -0.07
Chronic pulmonar 0.37 0.37 0.61 -0.12 -0.10
Ulcer 0.31 0.02 0.07 0.45 -0.16
Prostate 0.25 0.47 -0.07 0.46 -0.12
Cholesterol 0.40 0.06 -0.34 -0.24 -0.31
Catacracts 0.49 0.23 -0.15 0.16 0.10
Chronic skin 0.25 -0.06 0.11 0.32 -0.05
Constipation 0.46 -0.25 0.02 0.10 0.05
Depression 0.53 -0.31 0.05 0.00 -0.05
Stroke 0.32 0.23 -0.07 -0.13 0.53
Migraine 0.37 -0.46 0.16 -0.04 -0.21
Circulatory 0.59 -0.17 -0.03 -0.13 0.04
Cancer 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.43 0.26
Osteoporosis 0.43 -0.12 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03
Anemia 0.34 -0.28 0.21 0.07 0.35
Thyroids 0.27 -0.27 -0.02 -0.18 0.35
variance variance variance variance variance
16.2 6.8 6.4 5.1 5
2.3.2. Decomposing inequality. Next we turn to breaking down existing health in-
equality according to contributing factors of inequality. My analysis follows the method-
ology first presented by (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003). Intuitively, this consists of
an Oaxaca-Binder (Blinder, 1973 and Oaxaca, 1973) style of decomposition for a mea-
sure of inequality instead of using the mean the variable of interest . In particular, the
focus of this method is the concentration index (Wagstaff, Paci and van Doorslaer, 1991).
The concentration index is a measure of inequality widely used in health economics that
measures the degree of income based inequality. Its construction is very similar to that
of the Gini coefficient, but while the concentration index similarly ranks population ac-
cording to income, it plots it against the proportion of health. Formally, the concentration
index is defined from a concentration curve L(s) that plots the cummulative proportion of
the population ranked by income, starting with the lowest group, against the commulative
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proportion of health. A concentration curve with slope 1 indicates perfect equality be-
tween income groups, a value of -1 signals that health is concentrated purely in the lowest
income group and 1 that it is accumulated by the highest income group.
Following Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003), one can rewrite the concentration index
as a weighted sum of the concentration indexes of the different explanatory variables of
self reported health. The result is as follows. Let the following be a linear model of health
as a function of its k determinants. In my case, this is objective health, socioeconomic and
life style variables:
hi = α +∑
k
βkxki + εi
Then, it is possible to rewrite the concentration index C as:
C =∑
k
(
βkx¯k
μ
)
Ck +
GCε
μ
where μ is the mean of the concentration index, x¯ the mean of xk , and Ck the con-
centration index of variable xk. The term GCε is the generalized concentration index of
the residuals. According to this decomposition, it is possible to assess the contribution of
each variable to the overall income related inequality in health according to three terms:
i) its mean, ii) its effect on health, measured by the health status mode, and iii) how it is
distributed across income groups, which is captured by its concentration index. I perform
this decomposition on the model resulting from my test of the health paradox and report
the relative importance of the different components of health inequality in Catalunya in
2006.
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2.4. Results
2.4.1. Testing the hypothesis. Table 2 displays the results of testing the socieco-
nomic reporting heterogeneity. The results are presented as follows. First, I report the es-
timates of the coefficients of the model interacting the health indexes with income. Then, I
estimate the same model with additional variables on objective health and self care. While
not completely ruling out reporting heterogeneity in all the models, my results lend sup-
port to the hypothesis that part of the differences across income groups in reporting is due
to failure of properly accounting for true health differences. In all the models the main
effect of income loses significance after introducing the additional variables. However,
the interaction between the health indexes and income shows mixed results across specifi-
cations. The first PC loses significance in models one through five, but the fourth and fifth
PCs are significant.
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A shortcoming of current measures of objective health, such as the incidence of certain
conditions, is that they also contain information on the severity of the conditions and
its impact in individual well-being. Hence, evaluations based on those variables cannot
allow for reported severity levels to be a reflection of true health as opposed to an illusion
stemmed from reporting heterogeneity.
By adding some additional information on the individuals’ self care I have been able
to show that at least part of the effects previously identified as reporting heterogeneity are
in fact differences in “true” health states. A possible explanation for this result is that the
diminished severity could be due to the palliative effect of self care. In the next section I
discard the interaction terms, estimate a model of health with the full array of conditions
available in the ESCA and discuss more generally the effect of the different explanatory
variables.
2.4.2. The decomposition of the contributions to health inequality. Table 3 shows
the results of estimating self reported health on a model without interactions between
socioeconomic status and health. This model, supported by the results in the previous sec-
tion, has the advantage in that it allows for separately estimating the effect of the different
conditions on health. The signs of the effects are mostly significant and in the expected
direction. Most conditions negatively affect reported health, with the exception of strokes
and intestinal problems that are not significant. In the case of strokes, this is most likely
an issue of statistical power due to its very low prevalence (around 2% of the popula-
tion). Age negatively affects self-reported health for both males and females, with older
ages progressively reporting lower health statuses. The coefficient on education is positive
and significant for all education groups except the residual category of “others”. Interest-
ingly, there does not appear to be significant differences between the effect of secondary
and tertiary education. Both variables of the body mass index and hospital stays result in
lower self reported health as expected and non smokers and individuals who report more
physical activity report to be healthier.
2.4. RESULTS 43
TABLE 3. Self reported health model with all the conditions
Coefficient Std.error Coefficient Std. error
Intercept 76.72 ( 0.74 ) * M35-44 -2.19 ( 0.56 ) *
Smoking -1.16 ( 0.31 ) * M45-54 -4.13 ( 0.63 ) *
Exercise 3.54 ( 0.42 ) * M55-64 -4.03 ( 0.76 ) *
Hospital -1.59 ( 0.26 ) * M65-74 -2.07 ( 1.08 )
BMI -1.00 ( 0.29 ) * M75+ -5.49 ( 1.23 ) *
Hypertension -1.88 ( 0.39 ) * F15-34 -0.27 ( 0.47 )
Diabetes -3.45 ( 0.62 ) * F35-44 -2.64 ( 0.59 ) *
Heart -2.70 ( 0.58 ) * F45-54 -4.28 ( 0.63 ) *
Arthrosis -5.27 ( 0.32 ) * F55-64 -5.45 ( 0.73 ) *
Asthma -2.26 ( 0.63 ) * F65-74 -6.43 ( 0.89 ) *
Chronic pulmonar -2.41 ( 0.64 ) * F75+ -9.54 ( 0.93 ) *
Ulcer -3.08 ( 0.60 ) * Unemployed -2.92 ( 0.69 ) *
Prostrate -3.96 ( 0.94 ) * Disabled -12.53 ( 0.92 ) *
Cholesterol -1.37 ( 0.42 ) * Retired -2.69 ( 0.71 ) *
Cataracts -1.75 ( 0.59 ) * Home maker -1.20 ( 0.55 ) *
Chronic skin -1.96 ( 0.55 ) * Student 0.81 ( 0.58 )
Constipation -0.60 ( 0.50 ) Other -2.03 ( 4.59 )
Depression -7.29 ( 0.40 ) * Primary ed. 3.56 ( 0.48 ) *
Stroke -1.70 ( 1.18 ) Secondary ed. 5.04 ( 0.55 ) *
Migraine -2.50 ( 0.37 ) * Tertiary ed. 5.61 ( 0.61 ) *
Circulatory -3.44 ( 0.40 ) * Others ed. -0.91 ( 7.60 )
Cancer -3.75 ( 0.84 ) * Private ins. 1.03 ( 0.30 ) *
Osteoporosis -4.79 ( 0.63 ) *
Anemia -2.90 ( 0.56 ) *
Thyroids -1.83 ( 0.67 ) *
Adjusted R2 0.38
* p < 0.05
Table 4 shows the different components of the decomposition of the concentration
index and Table 5 has a summary of the overall contributions of the different categories to
income related health inequality. The largest contributor to health inequality is the income
gradient in the prevalence of the conditions considered. In particular, depression, artrosis
and circulatory problems stand out as the largest contributors within the group. The three
conditions are relatively highly prevalent and largely concentrated among lower income
groups. Furthermore, depression is among the largest contributors to overall inequality,
second only to university degrees. Differences in educational achievements are the second
2.4. RESULTS 44
group in contributions to inequality. The uneven distribution of university degrees across
income groups is a strong positive contribution to inequality.
TABLE 4. Contribution to the concentration index
CI Contrib. Cont./total* Cont./total Contrib. Cont./total
Smoking 0.0531 -0.0003 -2.6 M35-44 0.2552 -0.0007 -6.2
Exercise 0.0050 0.0002 1.9 M45-54 0.2886 -0.0013 -11.1
Hospital -0.0768 0.0002 1.9 M55-64 0.4420 -0.0016 -13.1
BMI 0.0289 -0.0002 -1.8 M65-74 0.4646 -0.0007 -5.7
Hypertension 0.0332 -0.0002 -1.6 M75+ 0.4381 -0.0016 -13.3
Diabetes -0.0139 0.0000 0.4 F15-34 -0.2412 0.0001 1.2
Heart 0.0147 0.0000 -0.4 F35-44 -0.1447 0.0005 3.9
Arthrosis -0.0251 0.0009 7.3 F45-54 -0.1893 0.0009 7.3
Asthma -0.0778 0.0002 1.3 F55-64 -0.2069 0.0010 8.6
Chronic pulm. -0.0423 0.0001 0.8 F65-74 -0.1764 0.0009 7.6
Ulcer 0.0255 -0.0001 -0.6 F75+ -0.1368 0.0013 10.9
Prostrate 0.4031 -0.0011 -8.9 Unemployed -0.6329 0.0011 9.3
Cholesterol 0.0461 -0.0001 -1.1 Disabled -0.1885 0.0011 9.4
Cataracts 0.0028 0.0000 -0.1 Retired 0.2942 -0.0019 -15.9
Chronic skin -0.0040 0.0000 0.1 Home maker -0.6591 0.0014 11.9
Constipation -0.1012 0.0001 0.7 Student -0.9129 -0.0006 -5.4
Depression -0.1277 0.0025 20.9 Other -0.2465 0.0000 0.1
Stroke -0.0186 0.0000 0.1 Primary ed. -0.1700 -0.0036 -30.4
Migraine -0.1305 0.0009 7.3 Secondary ed. 0.0488 0.0010 8.1
Circulatory -0.0966 0.0010 8.1 Tertiary ed. 0.4804 0.0058 48.3
Cancer 0.0229 0.0000 -0.3 Others ed. -0.3259 0.0000 0.0
Osteoporosis -0.1084 0.0004 3.6 Private ins. 0.2298 0.0011 9.3
Anemia -0.1528 0.0005 3.8
Thyroids -0.1461 0.0002 1.5
* Contribution over total is in percentual terms.
TABLE 5. Contributions to the concentration index by groups of variables
Contrib./total
Conditions and obj. health variables 43.0
Gender and age -10.0
Occupation 9.4
Education 25.9
Self care and private insurance 8.6
Interestingly, primary education contributes to the reduction of inequality. This is due
to the fact that, while having a positive effect on self reported health, it is heavily concen-
trated in lower income groups. Disparities in reported health across occupation groups are
also a source of inequality. The largest and most straightforward contribution is that of in-
capacitated people, mainly due to the size of its effect on health. Unemployment also has
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a significant contribution to overall inequality, in this case a heavy component is its large
concentration index. Interestingly, among the life style variables, smoking is responsible
for a reduction in health inequality. This is due to the higer prevalence of smoking among
males, who are also among the higher income groups. Another important contributor to
inequality are private insurances. Despite having a modest effect on self reported health,
their concentration index is relatively high and about two thirds of the individuals report
having a private insurance. Finally, the age-gender interaction contributes negatively to
inequality, mostly due to the combination of positive concentration indexes and negative
contributions to health of males.
2.5. Discussion
The main conclusion of this work is that failing to account for differences in “true”
objective health may be partially responsible for the income-related heterogeneity in self-
assessed health that has been found in previous studies. While my results do not com-
pletely rule out the presence of heterogeneity in reporting, they do suggest that at least
part of the differences come from “true” health differences derived from better self care
which is just one possible source of differences in “objective” health across income groups.
Other works that have used a wide array of measures of objective health, such as Etilé and
Milcent (2006) might have failed to account but relevant circumstances affecting the over-
all “true” health of individuals that otherwise share similar conditions. Here, by “true”
health I mean measures of well-being that are not affected by reporting differences and
could include considerations beyond the purely physical condition of the individual.
The second part of this work finds that differences in the prevalence objective con-
ditions are the largest contributor to income-related health inequality. This is because of
the large impact of prevalence objective conditions on self-assessed health they have and
the fact that concentration index of a majority of conditions, with notable exceptions like
prostrate conditions, is negate, indicating a disproportionate concentration among lower
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socioeconomic grups. This is particularly true for the case of the three largest negative
contributors to well being: depressions, circulatory problems, and artrosis. Despite its
lower contribution to income-related health inequality, educational differences are respon-
sible for a relatively large fraction of it, ahead of occupational based differences. Although
this is not a possibility that I have explored in the present work, it may very well be the
case that education is, similarly to income, capturing the effect of actual differences in ob-
jective health. Given the findings of the literature that related this variable to self-reported
heterogeneity (Dowd and Zajacova, 2010 and Bago d’Uva, O’Donnell and van Doorslaer,
2008), this is a promising direction for future research.
CHAPTER 3
Persistent Differences in Mortality Patterns Across Industrialized
Countries (with Hippolyte d’Albis and Loesse Jacques Esso)
47
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3.1. Introduction
Whether there is global convergence in well-being across countries remains in the
realm of scientific debate. The hypothesis of convergence has been studied for a variety
of dimensions of well-being, with mixed results. While economic convergence is not
a general reality (Barro and Sala i Martin, 2003), recent research has emphasized the
existence of global demographic convergence (Wilson, 2001) — in life-expectancy and
fertility — and its importance for reductions in the inequality in living conditions (Becker,
Philipson and Soares, 2005). We investigate the evolution of mortality patterns for a large
group of industrialized countries through an analysis of their ages-at-death distributions.
The ages-at-death distribution is given by the number of deaths at every given age in the
period life table.
Our research advances the current understanding of mortality convergence by, first,
formally testing the implications of the theory on the epidemiological transition, then sec-
ond, uncovering trends in mortality patterns beyond the evolution of the mean, i.e. life
expectancy, and variance of the considered distribution. Our chosen indicator of diver-
gence, the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD), provides a comprehensive measure of the
overall differences between distributions.
Studies of convergence classify differences between countries using two broad cat-
egories: first there is consideration for the unequal positions of countries in the stages
of their development; second are structural differences, dissimilarities that persist even
should countries become equally developed (Barro and Sala i Martin, 2003). Thus far, ex-
pectations for convergence in mortality have been based on a catching-up process between
countries in different stages of development. In particular, the hypothesis of convergence
in mortality patterns has been a natural corollary to the theory of epidemiological transition
(Omran, 1971), whereby countries lagging in their transition paths experience relatively
faster gains in life expectancy and acatch-up with countries in the later stages (Wilmoth,
2001 and Vallin and Meslé, 2004). This is a consequence of the first stage in development
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whereby reductions of death rates arise from reductions in infectious diseases, a phenome-
non with greater relative impact among infants. However, once the the reduction of infant
mortality and relatively easily preventable deaths at younger adult ages have been real-
ized, further gains in life expectancy are due to gains at older ages, which are increasingly
costly and occur at much slower rates.
In this work, we test and reject the convergence hypothesis for industrialized countries
in the period 1960-2008. However, we acknowledge that the lack of convergence for our
whole sample does not necessarily imply that there are not subgroups of countries con-
verging. In fact, the concept of convergence among subgroups or clubs of countries has
already received some attention in the mortality convergence literature (Bloom and Can-
ning, 2007). The basic theoretical difference is that proponents of the hypothesis of con-
vergence club postulate that there might exist not one but several long term ages-at-death
distributions. To address this possibility, we divide our sample in two groups, Eastern and
Western countries, based on former pertinence to a common political history. We find that
the trajectories of the two groups of countries are remarkably different. These results point
out that the overall divergence trend is partly driven by trends in the differences between
the two subgroups.
Our findings on the lack of convergence are coherent with recent findings that high-
light the relatively high variability of mortality at young adult ages across countries and its
contribution to international differences in mortality patterns (Edwards and Tuljapurkar,
2005, and Fillespie and Trotter, 2014). While the reduction of mortality at earlier life
stages described by the theory of the epidemiological transition has contributed to conver-
gence, differences in young adult mortality have acted as a countervailing
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3.2. Materials and methods
Our object of study, mortality patterns, is extracted from the period life-tables available
in the Human Mortality Database. Following the work by Edwards and Tuljapurkar (Ed-
wards and Tuljapurkar, 2005), we evaluate the dissimilarities between the ages-at-death
distributions of all our countries with the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD), a measure
of the overall dissimilarities between distributions. An advantage of using this index of
dissimilarity is that we are no longer restricted to the study of the mortality distribution
through its first two moments — life-expectancy and variance — which is particularly
relevant given the non-normality of ages-at-death distributions. We describe any group
of countries converging in mortality if the dissimilarities across their ages-at-death distri-
butions diminish. Since the KLD is a measure of pairwise differences, we compute each
sum of KLDs between individual countries and the period’s average distribution and study
its evolution. As we are only concerned with the trend (and not levels), this is formally
equivalent to computing the pairwise sum of differences across countries.
The divergence of the age-at-death distribution for country P from that of country Q is
given by the expression:
KLD(Q ‖ P) =
110
∑
α=0
ln
(
P(α)
Q(α)
)
P(α)
where P(α),Q(α) are the probability masses in each age group α = 0, ..., 110 .The
higher the value of KLD(Q ‖ P), the larger the differences between the two distributions.
In our exercise, the average age-at-death distribution is computed as the unweighted av-
erage of ages-at-death: for every age group α , the arithmetic mean was computed. For
a given sample of size N, where i denotes a country, our measure of dispersion can be
written as:
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N
∑
i=1
KLD(Q ‖ Pi) with Q(α) = 1N
N
∑
i=1
Pi (α)
Instead of focusing on the particular value of the KLD, in our exercise we set 1960 as
the base year.
Motivated by concerns of structural similarities and dissimilarities, we turn to the well-
known literature on the effect of political and economic transitions of former Soviet coun-
tries, a process which has exerted a major influence in the form of a mortality shock for
said countries (Leon, Saburova and Tomkins, 2007, and Meslé, 2004). In order to perform
an exploration of the importance of convergence clubs, we split the sample in two large
groups: Western and Eastern countries (Table 1). Countries within Eastern Europe that
experienced communism belong to our Eastern group of countries. In the next section, we
first present a graphical analysis of the mean and variance for both samples then comment
on the evolution of the KLD in the period 1960-2008.
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Mean-variance analysis. Before we turn to KLD trends we first consider the
traditional mean and variance study of the mortality distribution. We provide a graphical
analysis of the mean and variance of the ages-at-death distributions over time that also
uncovers interesting features of the epidemological transition. A remarkable feature of the
data is that the organization of Western countries in 1960 is mostly along a line that orders
countries in the space of high life expectancy — low inequality and low life expectancy
— high inequality. This correlation reflects the reality of countries in different stages of
their epidemiological transitions. After 50 years, the picture that emerges is drastically
different. Although there have been common trends among the majority of countries, i.e.
the generalized reduction of variance and the increase in life expectancy, the resulting
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distribution of countries encompasses a heterogenous landscape. The previous correlation
is less apparent, with countries with new profiles emerging from the distribution.
FIGURE 1. Variance and life expectancy profiles of Western countries
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Figures 1 and 2 plot the samples of Western and Eastern countries in the mean-variance
space for the years 1960 and 2008. In blue are the variance and life expectancy profile for
the year 2008 and in black for the year 1960.
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FIGURE 2. Variance and life expectancy profiles of Eastern countries
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For instance, we observe countries with similar variances (Denmark, Australia, Japan)
but with large differences in life expectancy. Performing a similar exercise for Eastern
countries yields an interesting contrast. In the latter case, the historical evolution is re-
versed, with countries evolving from many different profiles to the single dimension or-
dering as seen amongst Western countries in the 1960’s. The mean-variance profiles we
report are coherent with previous work (Robine, 2001, and Vaupal, Zhang and van Raalte,
2011) that relates the relationship between life expectancy and variance to the different
stages of the epidemiological transition.
In the next section we provide an evaluation of convergence based on the KLD. The
main strength of the KLD is that it encompasses the whole differences in distributions,
providing a clearer picture than analysis based on only a collection of moments. This
is particularly relevant for the analysis of the mortality distributions as infant mortality
breaks the normality of the ages-at-death distribution. The ages-at-death distributions of
the earlier periods contained a considerably larger number of infant deaths than the con-
temporary distributions, making mean-variance comparisons a less accurate evaluation.
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3.3.2. KLD trends. Our results indicate a clear pattern of divergence in our sample
of industrialized countries, as can be seen in Figure 3. The sum of KLD divergences to the
mean ages-at-death distribution is normalized with reference to the starting value in 1960.
The KLD for the whole sample is in blue, the Eastern countries in green and Western
countries are in red. The KLD diminishes from the 1960’s until the 1970’s, then rises over
the 1980’s. In fact, the KLD more than doubles by the end of the 1980’s, a period that
coincides with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, before returning to the positive trend
similar to the earlier part of the 1980’s. The trends reported remain very similar for both
genders, lending support to the robustness of our findings. Figure 4 depicts the KLD for
the whole sample is in blue, the female-only in brown and male-only in black.
FIGURE 3. Disparities across mortality distributions
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It is of note that the increase in male disparities is of a larger magnitude than that of the
female distribution. While by 2008 the female’s sample KLD is 1.76 larger that in 1960,
the male’s sample KLD is over 3 times larger.
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FIGURE 4. Disparities across mortality distributions by gender
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The relevance of taking into account the existence of clubs of countries becomes ap-
parent when observing the differences in the trends between the two groups of countries.
In the sample of Western countries we find a relatively flat profile of convergence for
mortality patterns (Figure 3); that is, no reduction in the overall differences in mortality
patterns. Our conclusion of no convergence is mainly based on the comparison with the
strength of the other trends we report. Given the volatility of the KLD a statistical analysis
of the trend is very sensitive to the period considered. The sample of Eastern countries
(Figure 3) reveals, as expected, a break immediately following the dissolution of the So-
viet Union. The first 30 years are marked by convergence, whereas in the late 1980’s the
trend is completely reversed and we observe a large increase in the differences, followed
by sustained increases in the KLD.
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3.4. Discussion
Our main finding suggests that, while the reduction in differences due to the catching
up process of countries at earlier stages of development is an important catalyst towards
convergence (Wilson, 2001), in the later stages structural differences between countries
have emerged and halted the convergence process, with young adult mortality differences
playing an important role (Gillespie, Trotter and Tuljapurkar, 2014). Based on previous
research that provided evidence of a mortality shock in former Soviet countries, we inves-
tigate the trajectories of two distinct groups of countries, Eastern and Western countries.
Our observations on Eastern countries, in line with previous studies (McMichael, Mckee,
Shkolnikov and Valkonen, 2004), point out that structural sources of differences may be
strong enough to set back the realized gains in life expectancy. We also find evidence of
the lack of a robust convergence process even amongst Western countries.
While our results uncover group specific trends, our classification of countries does
not identify convergence clubs. There exists a period of convergence for Eastern countries
prior to the 1990s but the recent history of development shows that Eastern countries are
no longer approaching a common distribution. Given the robustness of the lack of overall
convergence and the crucial role that group-specific dynamics play, further research is
needed to uncover the determinants of club membership and pertinence.
The discussion on the determinants of club membership can be divided into two ar-
eas of study depending on whether the focus is on the differences between developed and
developing countries or the differences amongst industrialized countries. When focusing
on the former, the literature has highlighted the existence of mortality traps (Vallin and
Meslé, 2004). That is, there is evidence that there might exist two types or clubs of coun-
tries, ones with low life expectancy and low growth of life expectancy and ones with high
life expectancy and high growth of life expectancy. In order to transition from one club to
another, a certain threshold of life expectancy must be reached. However, the variables that
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define a club still remain relatively unexplored. A first step in the search for these struc-
tural conditions can be to draw from the rich literature on the historical path of mortality
transitions for current high life expectancy countries (Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney,
2006). When considering industrialized countries, likely suspects are the variables that
influence young adult mortality. Given that a large part of the disparities across countries
\begin{tabular}{llll} \multicolumn{3}{c}{ } \\ \multicolumn{2}{c}{\bf{Western coun-
tries}} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{\bf{Eastern countries}} \\ \hline Australia & Luxemburg
& Belarus \\ Austria & Netherlands & Bulgary \\ Belgium & New Zeland & Czech Repub-
lic \\ Canada & Norway & East Germany \\ Denmark & Portugal & Estonia \\ Finland &
Sweden & Hungary \\ France & United Kingdom & Latvia \\ Iceland & US & Poland \\ Ire-
land & West Germany & Russia \\ Italy & ~ & Slovakia \\ Japan & ~ & Ukraine \\ \hline
\end{tabular}in mortality patterns can be attributed to young adult mortality (Gillespie,
Trotter and Tuljapurkar, 2014), it is reasonable to believe that the variables influencing
mortality for those age groups might play an important role in determining the formation
of convergence clubs.
3.5. Appendix
TABLE 1. List of countries
Western countries Eastern countries
Australia Luxemburg Belarus
Austria Netherlands Bulgary
Belgium New Zeland Czech Republic
Canada Norway East Germany
Denmark Portugal Estonia
Finland Sweden Hungary
France United Kingdom Latvia
Iceland US Poland
Ireland West Germany Russia
Italy Slovakia
Japan Ukraine
CHAPTER 4
A cohort perspective of the effect of unemployment on fertility
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4.1. Introduction
Two broad perspectives feature in the extensive literature on the relationship between
economic conditions and fertility. The first studies fertility and the economic cycle as
dynamic phenomena where shifts in fertility affect economic conditions and vice versa
(Lee, 1973). However, as evidence on fertility-based economic cycles has become more
tenuous over time (Poterba, 2001 and Abel, 2001), a second perspective, that of focusing
more on the effects of economic conditions on fertility, has emerged.
This second perspective has gained momentum in part because of the recent recession
from 2008 to 20091. The recession has resulted in a renewed interest in the effects of
economic conditions on fertility because it has coincided with a period of low fertility
rates in developed countries (Kohler, Villari and Ortega, 2002). Importantly, it is now
well-understood that sustained low fertility rates pose a serious threat to the sustainability
of transfer schemes such as the pension system. Developed countries have experienced a
downward trend in fertility rates in the last few decades. Some researchers claim that part
of this downward trend can be attributed to “delayed children”. That is, individuals still
choose to have children but choose to have them later in their fertility lives. According
to this strain of thought, families that were temporarily postponing fertility and were due
to start having the “delayed children” were yet again halted by the onset of the recession
(Goldstein, Kreyenfeld, Jasilionene, 2013) in 2008.
Among the variety of channels through which economic conditions affect fertility,
current reseach has highlighted the importance of unemployment (Sobotka, Skirbekk and
Philipov, 2011). In particular, a few key research questions have become of interest. The
first is, what are the differences between the permanent and temporary effects of unem-
ployment? It is possible that part of the current depression in fertility corresponds to
families opting to postpone childbearing. The second question is: what are the effects
1 These are dates for the United States according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. Exact
periods vary by country.
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of unemployment at different childbearing ages? In a context of a rise in mothers’ ages-
at-birth it becomes important to distinguish between the intensity of the effects by age
and accurately predict the effects of the economic crisis. Finally, what are the separate
effects of the cycle or variations in unemployment and the effects of the structural levels
of unemployment on fertility?
In this chapter, I empirically address these three questions through the lens of co-
hort fertility. I study 12 cohorts with birth years from 1957 to 1969 for eight developed
countries for which I have complete histories of fertility and unemployment. The main
advantage in using a cohort approach is that it allows capture of temporary and permanent
effects of unemployment at each age and can clearly separate the effects of unemployment
trends on fertility or evaluate postponement beyond specific birth orders.
I estimate the effects of unemployment on fertility using a panel data Bayesian ap-
proach. The Bayesian approach, used here with weak or uninformative priors, can provide
gains in efficiency, which is particularly relevant given the relatively small size of the
panel. My findings suggest distinct effects of both the levels and the cyclical variations of
unemployment. Throughout this chapter, I define the level of unemployment as the aver-
age level of unemployment during a period whereas the cycle is captured by the positive
and negative yearly variations within a given time span. I elaborate on these two concepts
in the presentation of my empirical strategy. While higher levels of unemployment nega-
tively affect fertility, the effect of cyclical variations depends on the age at which they are
experienced. Generally speaking, at younger ages there is no effect while for later periods
we observe countercyclical fertility. That is, under certain conditions cyclical increases
of unemployment can lead to raises in fertility rates. Interestingly, I find evidence of
permanent and temporary responses associated to both level and cyclical variations in un-
employment. This is particularly relevant given the puzzling and seemingly contradictory
perspectives in the literature on fertility and unemployment as my approach suggests that
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both perspectives capture true effects, and indeed are not contradictory when appropriately
accounting for level and cyclical effects.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss the background literature within
which this work is situated and the places where I make contributions. Then, I present
the data with my operationalization of the research questions and the Bayesian estimation
method. The next section contains the empirical results, which I discuss with a theoretical
model that rationalizes the heterogeneity by age of the effects of the level and variation of
unemployment. The last section concludes.
4.2. Literature review
Most studies conclude that worsening economic conditions lead to lower fertility (for
a recent comprehensive review of the empirical literature, see Sobotka, Skirbekk and
Philipov, 2011). For instance, Goldstein, Kreyenfeld, Jasilionene and Karaman Örsal
(2013) study the effect of unemployment on fertility in the context of the current recession.
However, earlier research has shown (Butz and Ward, 1979) that in a context of high lev-
els of female labor participation we can encounter countercyclical fertility. This empirical
result is aligned with the conclusion derived from theoretical microeconomic models that
identify recessions as periods where the opportunity cost of having children for working
women diminish (see Becker, 1981 and Heckman, 2014). It is commonly accepted that
this is the driving force behind the observed negative relationship between female labor
participation and fertility at the country level in earlier papers in the literature.
More recent work, however, has claimed that the earlier negative relationship between
participation levels and fertility may have changed from the late 1980’s onwards (Ann
and Mira, 2002)2. Adsera (2004), for instance, finds that high unemployment levels are
associated with lower fertility. Since countries with high levels of participation today
coincide with countries with lower levels of unemployment, the effect of unemployment
2 There is still controversy over whether the relationship between participation and fertility has changed
sign. For instance, Kögel (2004) does not find evidence of this change using time series models).
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levels could be enough to reverse the earlier negative relationship. A possible pathway
for this finding is presented in Ann and Mira (2001). The authors find support for the
hypothesis that high unemployment leads to delays in family formation and marriage;
through this mechanism, unemployment thereby lowers fertility. Thus, a tension exists in
the current literature. Higher levels of unemployment can decrease the opportunity costs
of having children, thereby increasing fertility rates. Yet, the patterns in existing countries
today seems to correlate high unemployment levels with lower fertility rates.
In this chapter, I propose to reconcile the tension behind these two findings by study-
ing the differential effects of the unemployment cycle and unemployment level. On the
one hand, temporary increases in unemployment, what I term unemployment cycle, can
increase fertility through lowering the opportunity cost of children via foregone wages. On
the other hand, high unemployment levels can drive down fertility because, among other
reasons, high unemployment increases the opportunity costs of building a professional ca-
reer. The final relationship between unemployment and fertility is then the sum of these
two conflicting forces. I consider both effects and as such include both in my models.
Unemployment cycle and level effects are both statistically significant, with the overall
direction of the total effect of unemployment depending on the relative strength of each
effect. Without considering the breakdown of the unemployment effect into both cycle
and level effects, as I propose here, we would have more difficulty identifying precisely
how and in what directions unemployment can affect fertility rates.
A relatively unexplored topic has been the distinction between the permanent and tem-
porary effects of unemployment (Sobotka, Skirbekk and Philipov, 2011). Neels, Theun-
yck and Wood (2013) are among the few papers that study the topic. The authors finds
evidence of postponement in a microeconometric model that relates increases in the prob-
ability of occurrence of a first birth at later ages with the level of unemployment at younger
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ages. In another work, Goldstein, Kreyenfeld, Jasilionene and Karaman Örsal (2013) dis-
entangle the effect of postponement from a pure reduction of fertility by performing sepa-
rate analyses on fertility rates and temporally-adjusted fertility rates. Their findings point
toestfd the existence of both effects. The cohort perspective I take in this work is particu-
larly well-suited to investigate the persistence of the effects of unemployment. Because I
track the fertility and unemployment histories of the cohorts throughout their entire fertile
lives, I can include measures of both contemporary and past unemployment in my models.
In addition, unlike Neels, Theunynck and Wood (2013), I am not limited to first births.
My findings also identify both postponement and permanent effects of unemployment on
fertility; interestingly, I find that there is substantial heterogeneity by age group.
4.3. Data and methods
4.3.1. Data. I use data on age-specific fertility rates by cohort from various countries,
available in the Human Fertility Database. I obtain the complete fertility history for twelve
cohorts from eight developed countries, born from 1957 to 1969. This includes informa-
tion on fertility rates from 1969 to 2009. The series on unemployment rates is from the
online repository of the International Labor Organization (ILO) for the period 1969-2009.
My main control variables are female participation rate and net migration flow, which I
obtain from the ILO and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) statistical repository respectively, also for the period 1969-2009.3 A complete list
of the countries used in my analysis is presented in Table 1 in the appendix.
4.3.2. Descriptive statistics and methods. There are several important advantages to
studying the effects of unemployment on fertility at a cohort level. First, given knowledge
3 Some countries have missing years for the female labor participation variable. In the majority of cases,
the missing values are concentrated in the early periods and is usually a single missing year. In some cases,
however, up to 5 years are missing. To deal with this, I have imputed the values assuming a linear trend
between the last and the first data values before and after the missing years. I have chosen a linear imputation
given how steady and linear the participation trend is at a cohort level. Furthermore, the imputation is less
important when considering the fact that I use cohort average levels of participation by taking the mean of
the participation level from ages 12 to 40.
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on the entire fertility history of the cohort, there is no uncertainty over the future possi-
ble effects of contemporary and past unemployment. This is not the case, for instance,
in Goldstein, Kreyenfeld, Jasilionene and Karaman Örsal (2013). Second, I am able to
observe the lifelong effects of unemployment at different ages, which allows for more ac-
curate capture of the effects of postponement. Finally, the cohort level perspective makes
it possible to control for trends and unobserved effects at both country and cohort levels4.
My key dependent variable is cohort age-specific fertility rate. For a given cohort, I
have information on the number of births per 1000 women for all years between ages 12
and 40. For tractability, I divide this variable into five age groups: 12 to 20, 21 to 25,
26 to 30, 31 to 35, and 36 to 40 years old. I sum the age-specific cohort fertility rates
of years included for each age group. While I have enough data to narrow down the age
groups, this would create a problem of dimensionality in the estimation. Since I include
the unemployment history in every model, more age groups would quickly increase the
number of parameters to estimate.
FIGURE 1. Cohort completed fertility
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A key issue in the estimation is how to properly account for fertility trends. In the
period considered, most countries are experiencing both general delays and reductions
4As a consequence of this reasoning, incomplete fertility histories of younger cohorts are not a part of this
analysis.
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in fertility. Figure 1 plots the cohort completed fertility for the 12 cohorts. The figure
shows a general decrease in completed fertility across cohorts for most countries. The
two extreme cases are Japan, with a very significant drop, and the United States, which
has a slight increase over the period. I also observe delays for all countries in the timing
of fertility during this period. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 2, which displays
cummulated fertility as a proportion of completed fertility of the cohort from ages 12 to
40 for the United States and Japan in 1957 and 1969.
FIGURE 2. Proportion of births by age 12-40
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I will address three main questions in this chapter. These three questions require em-
pirical measures for the concepts of unemployment cycle, unemployment level, postpone-
ment and foregone fertility. First, do variations in unemployment (cycle) and levels of
unemployment (mean) have separate impacts on fertility? I characterize the level of un-
employment as the mean of the yearly unemployment for a given childbearing age group.
For example, for the group that includes ages 25 to 30, the fertility level is captured by
the mean unemployment experienced from ages 24 to 29. On the other hand, the cycle is
meant to represent the variation in unemployment. I measure unemployment cycle through
the sum of the increases or decreases of unemployment in a given time span. For instance,
if in any given group of 5 years unemployment increased between any two years twice
and decreased three times, I separately keep track of the sum of the two increases and the
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three decreases. Do families postpone fertility when facing adverse economic conditions?
(and hence attenuate the contemporary negative effect of unemployment and fertility by
increasing fertility at later ages?) I introduce variables on the history of both unemploy-
ment levels and cycles on my modeling of cohort fertility. My specification includes a
complete record of the unemployment levels and both contemporary and lagged measures
of unemployment cycles. The objective is to be able to understand the life-long effects of
unemployment.
4.3.3. Model and estimation. I organize my panel so that countries are treated as
individuals and the different cohorts correspond to observations of a given country in
different moments in time. The structure of my models reflect the life cycle perspective of
cohort fertility. I model each age group separately including, when relevant, information
on their completely history of unemployment. For instance, for the first age group, ages
between 12 and 20, I estimate the age group cummulative fertility k ∈ (1, ...,8) , cohort
c ∈ (1, ...12), and age group a = 20 in the following way:
CFk,c,20 = αk,20+ tc,20+β20uk,20,c+ γ20pk,20,c+θ20nk.20,c+δ20Z+ ek,20,c
My dependent variable here is the cummulated fertility of an age group, CFk,c,20. The
terms αk,20 are age-specific fixed effects and tc,20 is a nonparametric country and age group
specific trend. In this case, time is measured in terms of cohorts. The term uk,20,g is the
mean unemployment between ages 12 and 195. The terms pk, j,g and nk, j,g capture the pos-
itive and negative variations in unemployment respectively. The vector Z includes controls
controls at a cohort level; I include the cohort mean level of female labor participation and
mean level of immigration6.
5The one year lag represents pregnancy.
6This is simply the average of both variables across the 28 years I follow the cohort.
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The model for the second age group (ages 21 to 25), includes information on the pre-
vious level of unemployment both in terms of cycle and level. The model is the following:
CFk,25,c = αk,25+ tc,25+β20uk,20,c+β25uk,25,c+ γ20pk,20,c+ γ25pk,25,c
+θ20nk.20,c+θ25nk.25,c+δ25Z+ ek,25,c
More generally, the model for age groups beyond the first age group can be written
in the following way. For a country k ∈ (1, ...,8) , age group a ∈ (2, ...,5) and cohort
c ∈ (1, ...12), the sum of the fertility each year of the age interval is estimated from the
following model:
CFk,a,c = αk,a+ tc,a+
a
∑
i=1
βiuk,i,c+
a−1
∑
j=a−2
γ j pk, j,c+
a−1
∑
l=a−2
θ jnk.l,c+δaZ+ ek,a,c
I estimate the model with Bayesian panel data methods. In particular, I use the inte-
grated nested Laplace approximation (INLA) algorithm recently developed by Rue, Mar-
tino and Chopin (2009). The INLA algorithm estimates a latent Gaussian model, in my
case with weak priors. I test the robustness of the results to several specifications of the
underlying distribution of the priors and my main results hold.
4.4. Results
4.4.1. Description of the results. Table 1 through 5 depict results from the main
models for the five age groups under study. Standard deviations of the estimated param-
eters are provided in parentheses next to each coefficient, while the three columns to the
right are upper bound, median and lower bound for the credible intervals of the estimation.
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This is a concept can be somewhat paralleled in interpretation to the significance level in a
frequentist approach. The credible intervals probabilistically identify where the estimated
parameters lie. We are most interested in effects that do not include 0 within their credible
intervals.
TABLE 1. Model 1: Age group 12 to 20
Credible interval
variables 0.025 0.5 0.975
Unemployment cycle
Positive
12-19 0.0249* (0.0076) 0.0098 0.0248 0.0399
Negative
12-19 0.0001 (0.00090) -0.0017 0.0019 0.0001
Unemployment level
12-19 -0.0007 (0.0029) -0.0064 -0.0007 0.0050
Controls
Immigration 0.0091* (0.0037) 0.0018 0.0091 0.0163
Participation -0.7339* (0.0734) -0.8780 -0.7340 -0.5897
In the different models I observe that the effect of unemployment varies greatly by
age, both in terms of cycle and level and with regard to postponement and reductions in
fertility. I later discuss how these results can be interpreted as suggestive evidence of
heterogeneity across families in the fertility response to unemployment. The first two
models correspond to the 12-20 year (Table 1) and 21-25 year (Table 2) age groups. We
can consider these groups as younger periods during which a fraction of the population is
still acquiring formal education. In the first age group fertility is heavily concentrated in
the later years of the interval. We note expected effects of both types of control variables
on the age groups: immigration increases fertility at younger ages whereas participation
diminishes it. Interestingly, for ages 12 to 20 only the unemployment cycle matters and
not the unemployment level: increases in unemployment have a positive (countercyclical)
influence on fertility.
4.4. RESULTS 69
TABLE 2. Model 2: Age group 21 to 25
Credible interval
variables 0.025 0.5 0.975
Unemployment cycle
Positive
12-19 -0.0230 (0.0284) -0.0784 -0.0232 0.0332
20-24 0.0023 (0.0122) -0.0215 0.0022 0.0265
Negative
12-19 0.0004 (0.0021) -0.0038 0.0004 0.0046
20-24 0.0039* (0.0013) 0.0013 0.0039 0.0065
Unemployment level
12-19 -0.0145* (0.0071) -0.0284 -0.0145 -0.0005
20-24 -0.0092* (0.0018) -0.0127 -0.0092 -0.0057
Controls
Immigration 0.0194* (0.0077) 0.0041 0.0194 0.0346
Participation -0.7224* (0.1572) -1.0339 -0.7214 -0.4166
This last result does not carry on to the second model for fertility between ages 21
and 25. The overall effect of unemployment in this model appears to come from the
negative influence of unemployment levels. I find that both contemporary and lagged
unemployment levels have a negative impact on fertility. That is, experiencing high levels
of unemployment at an earlier age diminishes fertility between 21 and 25 years old. The
results for the second age group are consistent with earlier findings (for instance Adsera
(2004) that link these effects to the career choices of families.
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TABLE 3. Model 3: Age group 26 to 30
Credible interval
variables 0.025 0.5 0.975
Unemployment cycle
Positive
20-24 0.08520* (0.0153) 0.0548 0.0852 0.1151
24-29 0.0508* (0.0195) 0.0123 0.0508 0.0891
Negative
20-24 0.0004 (0.0021) -0.0038 0.0004 0.0046
25-29 0.0123* (0.0016) 0.0091 0.0123 0.0155
Unemployment level
12-19 -0.0476* (0.0085) -0.0641 -0.0476 -0.0306
20-24 -0.0154* (0.0037) -0.0226 -0.0154 -0.0081
25-29 -0.0238* (0.0030) -0.0297 -0.0238 -0.0178
Controls
Immigration -0.0083* (0.0116) -0.0310 -0.0084 0.0145
Participation 1.0858* ( 0.2386) 0.6112 1.0881 1.5483
Model 3 encompasses the 26-30 year old age group (Table 3). Within this age group,
the effects of the controls are reversed, which is coherent with the idea that higher levels
of female labor participation are associated with a general postponement in childbearing.
In this model I find effects for both the cycle and level of unemployment. Unemployment
levels for the earlier years of the cohort (both ages 12 to 20 and 21 to 25) and the contem-
porary level of unemployment have a negative effect on fertility. In addition, the impact
of the cycle appears to be quite complex. First, contemporary increases in unemployment
have a countercyclical effect and increase fertility. At the same time, reductions in unem-
ployment also have a positive effect on fertility. Furthermore, increases in unemployment
that took place between ages 21 and 25 also increase fertility for this age group indicating
there may have been some postponement of children at earlier ages.
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TABLE 4. Model 4: Age group 31 to 35
Credible interval
variables 0.025 0.5 0.975
Unemployment cycle
Positive
24-29 0.0482* (0.0124) 0.0240 0.0482 0.0727
30-34 0.0599* (0.0161) 0.0283 0.0598 0.0916
Negative
25-29 -0.0019 ( 0.0015) -0.0049 -0.0019 0.0010
30-24 0.0033* (0.0016) 0.0002 0.0033 0.0064
Unemployment level
12-19 0.0148* (0.0046) 0.0058 0.0147 0.0238
20-24 0.0015 (0.0021) -0.0026 0.0015 0.0057
25-29 -0.0013 ( 0.0026) -0.0064 -0.0014 0.0037
30-34 -0.0023 ( 0.0020) -0.0061 0.0016 0.0016
Controls
Immigration -0.0178* (0.0078) -0.0332 -0.0178 -0.0025
Participation 0.2745* ( 0.1256) 0.0251 0.2751 0.5205
The complexity of the effects of the variation of unemployment persists in the model
for the age group between 31 and 35 (Table 4). In this model the previous effects of
variation also coexist. Increases in unemployment during ages 26 to 30 seem to be asso-
ciated with postponement since they positively affect fertility for the current age group.
In addition, both contemporary reductions and increases of fertility have a positive effect
on unemployment. However, the main difference with Model 3 is that fertility is unaf-
fected by current and all levels of unemployment with the exception of the unemployment
level between ages 12 and 20. This last effect can be interpreted as further evidence of
postponement.
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TABLE 5. Model 5: Age group 36 to 40
Credible interval
variables 0.025 0.5 0.975
Unemployment cycle
Positive
30-34 - 0.0107 (0.0090) -0.0283 -0.0107 0.0068
35-39 -0.0147* (0.0102) -0.0346 -0.0147 0.0053
Negative
30-34 -0.0019 (0.0009) -0.0012 0.0007 0.0026
35-39 0.0033 (0.0014) -0.0023 0.0005 0.0033
Unemployment level
12-19 0.0075* (0.0031) 0.0015 0.0075 0.0135
20-24 0.0021 (0.0011) -0.0002 0.0021 0.0043
25-29 0.0009 (0.0017) -0.0024 0.0009 0.0042
30-34 -0.0009 (0.0013) -0.0035 -0.0009 0.0017
35-39 0.0013 (0.0021) -0.0029 0.0013 0.0056
Controls
Immigration 0.0179* (0.0048) 0.0084 0.0179 0.0273
Participation 0.3816* (0.0840) 0.2171 0.3813 0.5474
The final model (Table 5) explains the effects of unemployment on fertility between
36 and 40 years old. The effects of unemployment are quite different from the earlier peri-
ods. First, only positive contemporary variations of unemployment have an unambiguous
impact: they reduce fertility (albeit in a more generous credible interval). In terms of
levels, the only impact comes from the unemployment level at ages 12 to 20, hinting at a
postponement effect.
4.4.2. Discussion of the results. Estimating models on the whole fertility history of
cohorts provides the distinct advantage of being able to interpret the results as a reflection
of lifelong choices. The caveat is that since the data is in the aggregate, a variety of re-
sponses to unemployment coexist in my results. In general terms, the results are coherent
with the narratives that emphasize the importance of career considerations in the timing
of fertility (Adsera, 2004). Between ages 21 and 25, fertility is negatively affected by
high levels of unemployment and there are no observable increases of fertility associated
to positive variations in unemployment. This seems to indicate lessened opportunity cost
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due unemployment is not a strong enough force to compensate for the potential negative
effects of interrupting early on labor market involvement. Between ages 26 and 35 I detect
countercyclical effects of unemployment, as well as mixed results for the effects of unem-
ployment levels. Finally, unemployment in the older age group seems to be strictly related
to lower fertility, particularly through the effect of positive unemployment variations.
It is noteworthy that there exists some seemingly contradictory effects in the results.
For example, for some age groups, increases in unemployment simultaneously lead to
higher fertility in the period in which they occur (countercyclical fertility) and to increases
in the fertility at later stage in life (postponement). I also observe a positive effect of reduc-
tions and increases in unemployment for a same age group. These situations are suggestive
of heterogeneous family responses to similar conditions. This could be explained through
the uneven impact of unemployment across families or because families with different
characteristics might be responding with different strategies to the same situation. In any
case, these situations indicate that further microeconometric analysis in the spirit of Neels,
Theunynck and Wood (2013) are needed. In the next section I explore the career effects
of unemployment with a formal model of fertility timing.
4.5. Discussion
In this section, I rationalize my empirical findings with a model of fertility delays
inspired in the work by Radjan (1999) and Adsera (2004). I propose an explanation for
the heterogeneity across ages of the effects of unemployment based on the career and
experience effects on unemployment. This exercise is conducted to verify the feasibility
of observing the previous section’s empirical results in a formal model with a reasonable
set of assumptions on the career effects of fertility. In the model, labor market career
considerations are behind the timing of fertility.
Although I follow a similar model structure as in Radjan (1999), the mechanism
through which unemployment affects fertility is different. Radjan models childbearing
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as an irreversible decision in the context of income uncertainty. The main finding of the
model is that as income levels soar, fertility postponement becomes more attractive. The
reason is that the cost of having a child is consumption foregone, which due to the con-
cavity of the utility function is higher when facing lower levels of income. Adsera (2004)
modifies Radjan’s model to incorporate the effect of childbearing on unemployment. In
a sense, Adsera’s work endogenizes income uncertainty to a certain extent through an
unemployment probability function that depends on fertility decisions. The main differ-
ences between my model and Adsera’s are two. While Adsera models fertility in a two
period model I include an additional period to allow for heterogeneity across ages of the
effects of unemployment. My empirical findings, along with those existing in the liter-
ature, strongly support the hypothesis that there is significant variability in the fertility
response to unemployment across ages. In addition, I distinguish between the effect of the
general unemployment level and an increase in unemployment. In my model this is cap-
tured by directly considering a general parameter, the unemployment level, and studying
the decision of a family in a situation of unemployment.
In my simplified setting, I consider a model where a family (or female) lives 3 periods
and must to decide whether and when to have a maximum of one single child in either of
the first two periods. It is a model concerned exclusively with fertility timing. The utility
of a family in any given period is given by their consumption and the utility derived from
the child:
U (ct)+φκt
where κt is an indicator function equal to one if there a child is present in the household
and φ is the utility brought by him/her.
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In each period, prior to the family making a fertility decision, the family learns about
their employment status, which depends upon their previous participation in the labor mar-
ket and on whether a child was born in the previous period. The probability of employment
is given by the function:
et
(
t−1
∑
1
li;ρt ;κt−1
)
where ρt is the aggregate level of unemployment , κt−1 captures if a child was born
the previous period and li the amount of time spent in labor market activities in previous
periods. Previous attachment to the market, represented by the sum of labor market time
over the life time, increases the probability of employment: e(.)l > 0. However, it has
diminishing returns: e(.)l l > 0, a standard assumption in the literature of wage determi-
nation. I also assume that previous experience is more valuable when there is a high level
of unemployment: e(.)l ρ > 0.
This last assumption is crucial for some of the results in the model. Recent work in the
empirical literature on wage determination (Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz, 2012)
has found that workers entering the market during recessions are more affected by the
adverse labor market conditions than those with more years of experience. In my model,
the fact that past experience is more valuable in terms of employabiltiy in bad times has
the direct implication that structural unemployment diminishes fertility.
The time allocation of the familiy is described as follows. Conditional on employment,
their time allocation is given by:
T ≥ lt +mt
In each period, families have T amount of time; mt represents time allocated towards
childcare. The decision to have a child has two direct implications in the model. First,
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having a child restricts the labor market experience and hence future employability. Fur-
thermore, following Adsera, having a child imposes a direct penalty on employment in the
next period: e(.)κ < 0. Regardless of the employment status, the family is guaranteed a
minimum income y.7 Hence, the budget constraint of the family is given by:
wlt + y ≥ ct
The model can be solved by backwards induction and a solution is given by the deci-
sion to give birth the first period, in the second or to forego childbearing altogether.
4.5.1. The effect of the general level of unemployment. We first consider the effect
of an increase on the general level of unemployment, which corresponds to the unemploy-
ment level effects of the previous section’s empirical exercise. Instead of solving the model
with a particular set of parameters, I assume a given history and observe how an increase
in the level of unemployment affects the fertility decision. In particular, I consider the case
where the family is childless, employed by period 2 and has had employment since period
1. This scenario is interesting because the value of further employment is the lowest of
all possible histories. As it is thus the least likely case where we might observe a delay in
fertility, it is a "hard case" for observing consistent results with my empirical findings in
the previous section. Suppose that ρ (the unemployment level) increases, then it follows
from the assumptions on the employment function that foregoing fertility becomes more
attractive. To see why, consider the indirect utility of having a child:
Vk =U (.)|κ2=1+φκ2+e(.)|κ2=1
(
U (.)|l3>0+φκ3
)
+
(
1− e(.)|κ2=1
)(
U (.)|l3=0+φκ3
)
and the utility of not having a child:
7This can be interpreted, for instance, as the unemployment subsidy.
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Vnk =U (.)|κ2=0+ e(.)|κ2=0U (.)|l2>0+
(
1− e(.)|κ2=0
)
U (.)|l3=0
where U (.)|κt=1 is the utility of consumption in the first period when the family has a
child and the rest of terms have a similar interpretation. The difference between the two
indirect utilities consists in three terms. The first term is the utility derived from the child.
The second term is the additional probability of employment evaluated at the additional
utility gained from employment. The final term is the loss of income in the current period.
The family simply chooses max
{
Vk,Vnk
}
. Denote 
3ek2=0k2=1 the difference in the future
probability of employment between a familiy with and without a child, 
2Uk2=0k2=1 the dif-
ference in the utility derived from consumption from having a child, and 
3Ul3=0l3>0 the
difference in utility for the future period between an employed family and an unemployed
family
The family decides against having a child if the following is true:
Ω=
3ek2=0k2=1
3U
l3=0
l3>0
+
2Uk2=0k2=1 −2ψ > 0
Given the assumption that a greater past attachment to the labor market is more im-
portant in times of higher general levels of unemployment, e(.)l ρ > 0, this implies that
Ωρ > 0 since
d
3ek2=0k2=1
dρ > 0. That is, the option to forego fertility, in the case of the third
period, or more generally to delay fertility becomes more attractive as the general level of
unemployment rises.
4.5.2. The differential effect of unemployment at younger ages. Another finding
of the model is that unemployment has countercyclical effects that can occur in the middle
stage of a fertility life for a given family. In the model, this mirrors the decision of a family
that is currently unemployed. The idea behind countercyclical effects is that individuals
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facing an unemployment spell may face an incentive to have children as there is no longer
an opportunity cost in terms of foregone salaries. However, whether this incentive is a
dominant force depends on the family’s previous labor experience and also on their age.
In the model, this is because at older ages the probability of having a positive labor history
is larger. To illustrate the forces at play, I turn to the effect of unemployment in periods 1
and 2 of the model separately.
As with the previous exercice, I study a limit case. Consider first the case of a family
that is unemployed in the first period and knows that choosing to not have a child in the
first period makes it a dominant strategy to have a child in the second period regardless of
their employment status. In this scenario the problem becomes strictly a matter of timing.
In this case, the family delays childbearing if the value of early labor experience
is high enough. To see why, consider lifelong utility of the two options. Recall that
the presence of a child is represented by the indicator function κt , hence only consider
{κ1 = 0,κ2 = 0,κ3 = 0} for Vnk.
V k
U(·)|l1=0+φκ1+e2(·)|k1=1U(·)l2>0+φκ1
e3(·)l2>0U(·)l3>0+φκ3 (1− et+2(·)|lt+1>0)U(·)l2=0+φκ3
U(·)|l1=0+φκ1+(1− e2(·)|k1=1)U(·)l2=0+φκ1
e3(·)|l2=0U(·)|l3>0+φκ3 (1− e3(·)|l2=0)U(·)|l3=0+φκ3
The comparison between the two options has three main components. The first term
is the additional utility provided by having the child in period one . The second term is
the higher expected wages in the second period if a child is born in the first period, but at
a lower probability of employment in the second period.
Φ=
[
e2 (.)|k2=0U (.)|l2=T−m
]
−
[
e2 (.)|k2=1U (.)|l2=T
]
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The third term is the effect on employability in the third period, evaluated at the utility
gains from employment, of the two fertility timing options. Having the child while un-
employed is a strategy that emphasizes the lower opportunity cost of childbearing while
unemployed. It implies lowering the opportunity of employment in the second period but
freeing up time in case employment is found in that period. On the other hand, the de-
cision against having a child when unemployed prioritizes early involvement in the labor
market by increasing the chances of employment in the second period and lowering them
the third. In terms of the model, the comparison is between these two terms:
Ψ=
[
e2 (.)|k2=0 e3 (.)|k3=1,l3=T−mU (.)|l3>0
]
−
[
e2 (.)|k2=1 e3 (.)|k3=1,l3=T U (.)|l3>0
]
Which strategy prevails in this comparison depends on the concavity of the employ-
ment probability function. If the returns to experience have sufficiently high diminishing
returns, then early involvement in the labor market is the dominant strategy. To see why,
suppose that both childbearing and working part-time incur the same penalty in terms of
employability, and that this penalty takes form of a reduction in accumulated experience:
e(∑ l− p)where p denotes the penalty. Then, without considering general unemployment,
the comparison becomes:
Ψ=
[
e2
(
∑ l
)
|k2=0 e3
(
∑ l−2p
)
|k3=1,l3=T−mU (.)|l3>0
]
−
[
e2
(
∑ l− p
)
|k2=1 e3
(
∑ l
)
|k3=1,l3=T U (.)|l3>0
]
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If e() is concave enough then,
e2(∑ l)|k2=0
e2(∑ l−p)|k2=1
>
e3(∑ l−2p)|k3=1,l3=T−m
e3(∑ l)|k3=1,l3=T
and the family de-
cides to postpone childbearing. The intuition is that the concavity of e(.) makes facing
employability penalties more attractive once the family has accumulated labor experience.
The main difference in evaluating the decision of an unemployed family in their second
period is that the costs do not include such lifelong career impacts. In this case, the
family balances the lower possibilities of employment in the third period against the utility
derived from having a child. Furthermore, a larger potential pool of experience lowers
the value of postponing (in this case, foregoing) fertility. For the sake of illustration,
consider the tradeoff faced by a family that is currently unemployed in period two, but
was employed in period one:
Vk =U (.)|l2=0+φκ2+ e2 (.)|k2=1U (.)|l3>0+φκ3+
(
1− e2 (.)|k2=1
)
U (.)|l3=0+φκ3
Vnk =U (.)|l2=0+ e2 (.)|k2=0U (.)|l3>0+
(
1− e2 (.)|k2=0
)
U (.)|l3=0
The family will decide to forego childbearing if the utility of the additional expectation
of employment is sufficiently large. Denote 
3ek2=0k2=1 the difference in the future probabil-
ity of employment between a family with and without a child, and 
3Ul3=0l3>0 the difference
in utility for the future period between an employed family and an unemployed family.
The family decides foregoing fertility if the following is true:
Γ =
3ek2=0k2=1
3U
l3=0
l3>0
−2ψ > 0
The penalty for childbearing is diminished here, compared to an unemployed family
in period one, for two reasons. The first is that, given a previous history of unemploy-
ment, the effect of the childbearing penalty is smaller given the concavity of e(.). The
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second is that the penalty on employment affects only the third and final period, without
compounding for additional periods. Naturally, in models with more periods, the lifelong
impact on the career of the family is greater the earlier the family has the child. Taken
together, the results in this model indicate that, under plausible assumptions, some of the
observed empirical relationships between fertility and unemployment are coherent with
an explanation based on the career effects of fertility. My theoretical is a contribution to
the existing literature on the effects of unemployment on fertility; in particular, I extend
existing models to capture the differences in the impact of unemployment across ages.
4.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I link the complete histories of both fertility and unemployment for
12 cohorts in eight developed countries to study the temporary and permanent impacts of
unemployment on fertility. I can reconcile the seemingly contradictory results of earlier
related literature that have separately highlighted the importance of counterclycical fertil-
ity and structural unemployment by decomposing the effects of unemployment into both
cycle and level effects and separately estimating the two. Indeed, my results show that, in
order to correctly assess the impact of unemployment, it is important to separately study
the effects of unemployment levels and unemployment cycles across age groups. Esti-
mation results on the panel data demonstrate a high variability of the fertility responses
across ages. I find that the unemployment level has a negative effect that fades at older
ages. The unemployment variation (cycle) triggers both delays and a countercyclical re-
sponse between ages 25 and 35, however countercyclical effects seem to be the dominant
contemporary effect.
In the second part of the chapter, I explored whether my empirical observations are
coherent with a formal model of fertility timing with career considerations. In general
terms, it is possible to obtain my main results from a model of fertility timing where labor
participation has long lasting career effects. In the model, high unemployment levels are
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associated with fertility delays when labor experience is more important in times of job
scarcity. Also, the costs associated with temporary interruptions of labor market partici-
pation are greater at younger ages. The age specific effects of unemployment variations
can be explained through the lifelong impact of an early interruption of the career.
A natural next step is to bring the life cycle perspective of this work to microeconomet-
ric models. While I find a solid set of results regarding the lifelong effects of unemploy-
ment that can be interpreted in terms of career choices, some of these results are indicative
of heterogeneous responses. For instance, between ages 25 and 35 I observe delays in
fertility and a countercyclical behavior, which is coherent with different strategies across
families. A microeconometric approach would also benefit from some of the specification
choices in my work. First, I have showed how unemployment has effects well beyond the
year it takes place, hence it would be necessary to take a life cycle perspective in the analy-
sis. In addition, an insight from my work is the necessity to distinguish the unemployment
cycle and level.
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